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Immigration has become a highly controversial and publicized
topic, and will continue to be so in the coming years. It is clear that
immigration, both legal and illegal, has had a central role in Califor-
nia's startling demographic changes and fiscal stress during the last
decade. Unabated, it promises similar changes in the future.
The debate to date has focused largely on the economic conse-
quences of illegal immigration. Among other things, there has been a
sharp deterioration of work skills of immigrants since the 1970s,
with current law paying scant attention to U.S. economic needs.
However, there are potential social consequences as well. Never
before in the nation's history has so disproportionate a share of all
immigration fallen on one state, California. In addition, the break-
down of the traditional American goal of assimilating immigrants
into the mainstream culture threatens the social cohesiveness and
sense of community that California will need if it is to prosper as a
multi-ethnic society in the 21st century. For California, unabated
immigration on the scale of recent years will be the social equivalent
of the deficit unless we deal with it positively: a destructive legacy,
the consequences of which will be faced by our children and
grandchildren because we failed to.
* Richard Sybert, Executive Director of the California Center for Public Policy,
located in Calabasas, California. Mr. Sybert formerly was Director of Planning and Re-
search for the State of California under the Wilson Administration.
This Article is an excerpt from Richard Sybert, California Center for Public Policy,
Population, Immigration, and Growth in California (Calabasas, California 1994). The
author is solely responsible for its content and all sources and statistics.
The United States, and California in particular, can no longer af-
ford - socially, financially, or economically - an immigration pol-
icy that ignores workforce needs, poses an enormous financial burden
on taxpayers, tears at the country's social fabric under the banner of
divisive multiculturalism, and throws open the doors of America to a
shrinking world overburdened with billions of impoverished and un-
skilled people with no end in sight. At some point we must attend to
the pressing needs of our own population. A 19th and 20th century
immigration policy must now change for the 21st. We should use our
immigration policies to attract the skilled, the educated, the hardest
working, and the most self-reliant to our shores, to help the U.S.
economy prosper and to compete in the global market.
The sources of quantitative and other data used in this study are
indicated. I am grateful to the Demographic Research Unit of the
California Department of Finance, the Health and Welfare Agency,
and other California state government offices for their input, review,
and comment. I am similarly grateful to outside demographers in-
cluding Peter Morrison of RAND in Santa Monica and Tony Quinn
of Braun Ketchum in Sacramento.
I also hasten to add that I am solely responsible for the content of
this paper. As the state Director of Planning and Research from
1991 to 1993, I was statutorily responsible for analyzing and assess-
ing the long-term impacts of population and settlement trends in
California. I have waited until I was no longer in that position to
make clear these are my personal views and not necessarily those of
the Administration. At the same time, I can think of no subject more
vital to the future of California. I hope this paper will add to and
inform the debate.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The issue of population growth is increasingly raised in California,
particularly in the context of immigration. Some people believe that
California should somehow limit its population before the "carrying
capacity" of the state is exceeded, either in terms of environmental
impacts or in the general quality of life for those already here.
California has grown substantially since World War II. The state
has tripled its population, from ten million to thirty million, in the
roughly two generations from 1950 to 1990. Traditional environmen-
tal concerns about the impacts from such growth have lately been
joined by objections to greater congestion and demographic changes.
Rapid population growth in California has spurred associated
problems, such as congestion and environmental impacts. It has also
brought diversity and economic stimulus. People want to come to
California because of opportunity and because it is a good place to
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live. The population is increasing through economic and social forces
that to date are beyond the ability of state government to address
significantly.
The primary driver in population growth in California is now im-
migration. Net domestic migration to California from the other
forty-nine states has turned negative. The largest single component
in growth, natural increase, is in fact probably due in greater part to
the higher birth rate among many immigrants.
As many as 7.4 million of California's population, or nearly a
quarter of the total, is foreign-born, including 1.6 million amnesty
immigrants legalized by the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control
Act (IRCA). New 1990 federal immigration and refugee laws will
raise total annual immigration to the United States to approximately
800,000. An additional 200,000 are expected to arrive illegally each
year, for an annual total of one million.
Of this number, 300,000 to 350,000 (including fully half of the
illegal immigrants) are likely to settle in California, or roughly one-
third. This is proportionally two-and-one-half to three times greater
than California's twelve percent share of the national population.
Even so, this understates the long-term impact on the state because
of sharply higher fertility rates among immigrant groups.
However, efforts to meet the needs of California's rapidly growing
and diversifying population with shrinking state revenues are seri-
ously hampered by the federal government's failure to make good on
its pledge to adequately fund (or enforce) its immigration policies. It
is important not to blame these fiscal impacts on legal immigrants
themselves, most of whom work hard and whom we should want to
succeed.
Instead, the blame is the federal government's, which effectively is
forcing California to pay for national immigration and refugee poli-
cies as much as four times out of proportion to its population. This is
a disservice both to the existing population and to the immigrants.
For the federal government, immigration has become a profit center.
The federal government is solely responsible for immigration and
refugee policies. The federal government's failure to compensate
California for this disproportionate impact from national policies is a
primary factor in the state's continuing fiscal crisis. This in turn
hamstrings the state in dealing with growth because it cannot pay
for needed infrastructure, better planning, investments in education
and housing, or even the existing level of services that a growing
population needs and deserves.
Studies in Orange, San Diego, and Los Angeles counties have de-
termined uncompensated local costs from immigration to be signifi-
cant. The most recent Los Angeles county study found that, with the
exception of public health services, immigrants do not use county
services at higher levels than non-immigrants, but at a relative net
cost up to four times greater because of fewer taxes paid. Without
full federal assistance, the effect is that the non-immigrant popula-
tion is heavily subsidizing the cost of immigration. The Orange and
San Diego county studies also found significant impacts from, re-
spectively, refugees and illegal immigration.
Uncompensated state costs associated with immigration are also
substantial. The California Department of Finance estimated the
cost of immigration-related services to the state at approximately
$4.787 billion in 1992-1993, including $474 million in Medi-Cal,
$444 million in Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)
and SSI/SSP, $243 million for the prison system, and $3.626 billion
in K-12 school costs. These figures do not include the costs of addi-
tional infrastructure, greater congestion, or environmental impacts.
These billions of dollars spent on immigration-related services are
then not available to build needed infrastructure, protect open space,
or otherwise pay for better planning and development patterns. Para-
doxically, this population growth heightens the need for just such
programs.
In effect, California is paying the bill for the nation's immigration
policies. The state is forming the human capital for much of the na-
tion's future growth.
While high immigration and birth rates have substantial short-
term and medium-term net service costs, in the long term they may
benefit the economy (to which they certainly contribute now, but
most benefits are private while most costs are public) by increasing
the skilled labor pool, assuming adequate educational levels and as-
similation. Changing age demographics of California and the United
States indicate potentially serious labor shortages in the future and
higher dependency ratios of older, as well as younger, residents to
the working-age population.
At the same time, the skills level of the future workforce will be
significantly higher and different than today. In a free-trading world,
neither the United States nor California can compete on the basis of
unskilled labor. Our competitive advantage, if we wish to maintain
higher living standards, must come in adding value through an edu-
cated workforce and high productivity. Changed immigration policy,
which currently focuses on extended family reunification and results
in largely low-wage, low-skill flows, can help achieve these goals by
focusing more on workforce needs and skills. The most recent immi-
gration work-needs program is a step in this direction.
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California should seek federal action on two levels: (1) to compen-
sate California for the hugely disproportionate financial burden it
bears from the nation's immigration and refugee policies; (2) to re-
form immigration law to reduce overall numbers and put greater fo-
cus on workforce needs.
These actions are advisable if California is to maintain a high
quality of life for all its people, newcomers as well as long-time resi-
dents. If the state proves unable to control or cope with further pop-
ulation increases, and as a result the quality of life, economy, and
the environment become sufficiently degraded, growth will stop and
population will decline as residents seek more hospitable locations. It
is only through such a failure of public policy that the projections of
population increase reverse. However, that increase can be moder-
ated, controlled, and compensated. Unmanaged growth can over-
whelm California. Managed growth - fairly funded, intelligently
shaped, and welcoming new energy - can focus on the quality of
life for all Californians.
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I. INTRODUCTION
California's astonishing population growth, although slowed by the
current economic difficulties of the state, is continuing. From ten
million in 1950, to seventeen million a generation later, to more than
thirty-two million in 1994, our state is growing by 600,000 people a
year, the equivalent of adding an entire Ventura County annually, or
six Burbanks. Today, there are nearly ten million people in Los An-
geles alone.
In the late 1980s, when growth was even greater at some 800,000
a year, the issue of population growth was often raised in the context
of "growth management," based on the belief that too many people
are destructive to the environmental quality of California and, hence,
have a negative impact on the quality of life. This area of enquiry
was also based on the environmental notion of "carrying capacity,"
which assumes that the land or the earth has a limited ability to
support life, specifically human population.'
In the 1990s, environmental concerns over population growth gave
way to fiscal concerns as it became apparent that immigration was
the driving force in that growth directly and indirectly, and was
overwhelming the fiscal capability of California to offer services both
to its own residents and to disproportionate waves of newcomers.
With twelve percent of the nation's population, California was tak-
ing in three or four times that number of the nation's immigrants. A
lively debate over the contributions and costs of immigration has fol-
lowed, while.the state's attempts to secure even partial federal reim-
bursement for costs have largely foundered. Most of the discussion
I. "Carrying capacity" as used in these debates can have two meanings. The first
is technical, scientific carrying capacity. In this sense, California can support a far larger
population than it does now, albeit under changed conditions that most Californians
probably would not like. The second meaning of "carrying capacity" is the level of popu-
lation we would like California to have, as necessary to support a given quality of life or
resource protection. It is this second sense that people usually intend.
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has focused on the impacts of illegal immigration specifically.
Population increases in California, and immigration trends
throughout history, have been demonstrably related to both lifestyle
and economic opportunities. California is a destination point because
it offers both. Indeed, California's success in managing its own
growth is to a certain extent the very reason that more growth is
forthcoming. The other side of this coin is that people will stop com-
ing here if the state becomes an unpleasant place to live. This is a
"goal" to which no responsible government can subscribe.
Reality is that California's population will continue to increase,
through social and economic forces that are beyond the ability of
state or even national government to address significantly. However,
three significant steps can be taken, all at the federal level, to moder-
ate and improve the impacts of that growth:
1. First, the federal government can abate illegal immigration by enforcing
our borders. As in most other countries, the armed forces are suited to this
role.
2. Second, Congress should reform immigration law to moderate the num-
bers of arrivals and to put greater emphasis on U.S. workforce needs in
regulating admission. Asylum and refugee laws should be tightened to fight
abuse.
3. Third, the federal government should reimburse California and other re-
cipient states for the considerable fiscal impacts of immigration. We should
insist that the federal government pay for those impacts which are the re-
sult of national policy.
In the meantime, we should try to manage and deal intelligently
with the growth that does occur.
There are also social consequences of large-scale immigration. The
basic "deal" that has historically sustained the United States as a
proud and successful nation of immigrants has broken down. In ex-
change for the economic opportunity and personal liberty that this
country affords, immigrants were expected to learn English and to
assimilate into the mainstream culture - in short, to become Amer-
icans. That deal is now breaking down, under the weight of enforced
multiculturalism and diversity. Thus, there is a social and cultural
aspect to the immigration issue as well.
This paper presents objective data and analysis regarding the com-
ponents of California's population growth. It also reviews fiscal im-
pacts from immigration - their main component. While there is
some debate as to the exact parameters of these fiscal impacts, there
should be no doubt that they are substantially negative for state and
local governments. Finally, the paper examines United States
workforce needs as they may be affected by an expanding population
and as they may implicate immigration.
II. HISTORICAL GROWTH
California's population has seen tremendous growth in the decades
since World War II. Most Californians have come from somewhere
else. Opportunity and plentiful natural resources have made the
Golden State the destination of millions who seek the "California
lifestyle" and the benefit of the state's economy. Sustained economic
growth has been fed by these large population increases. Since 1945,
the state has experienced unparalleled economic expansion tempered
only by brief periods of recession. The current economic downturn
promises to break that pattern.
At the same time, burgeoning population growth - over ten mil-
lion new people in the last twenty years - has increasingly given
many Californians a sense of discomfort. The state's physical and
human infrastructure systems, including roads, sewers, and schools,
all have been stressed. Straight-line projections based on historical
data predict as many as ten to fifteen million more Californians in
the next twenty years. Those projections have raised not only anxiety
and resistance on the part of many Californians, but have also cre-
ated serious discussion about growth management, growth control,
growth limitation, and population limits.
Environmental interests in the state have long been concerned
about the impact of increased population on the destruction of for-
ests and wetlands, the urbanization of coastal areas, and the loss of
prime farmland to suburban sprawl. Historically there have been
many attempts to manage and direct growth to protect California's
resources, beginning with the Williamson Act in the 1960s and the
Coastal Act of 1976 (with its genesis in Proposition 20 four years
earlier). Both policies were established to protect threatened re-
sources from the negative impacts of development. Other analogues
have followed, such as establishment of conservancies to protect
Lake Tahoe and the Santa Monica Mountains.
The debate about the impact of growth on natural resources re-
sumed again in the late 1980s with new force as population growth
accelerated. This time, traditional environmental interests were
joined by a large and vocal number of the state's voters and residents
who believed that with more population comes not only the destruc-
tion of natural resources and the environment, but also a general loss
of "quality of life."
Among older Californians, for example, there is almost a collec-
tive "genetic memory" of open space and land resources in a wide-
open state where everyone could enjoy the benefits of climate and
aspire to homeownership and economic prosperity. In less than fifty
952
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years, for example, the Los Angeles Basin, which was once filled
with orange groves, has been transformed into a crowded, traffic-con-
gested, urban environment. The Santa Clara Valley in Northern
California has seen a similar transformation.
On a lesser scale, similar fates have befallen other parts of Cali-
fornia. Crowded and aging central cities, plagued with high crime
rates and deteriorating facilities, have become less desirable. The
middle class has fled to the suburbs in search of better housing and
schools, more open space, cleaner air, and a more "hassle-free,"
more "traditionally California" lifestyle.
Changing demographics also undoubtedly play a part in public
unease over growth. Most recent immigration in California has been
largely Hispanic and Asian, increasing the state's cultural diversity
but also potentially adding to social tension. Diversity undoubtedly
has its limits; Bosnia is diverse. The seeming abandonment of assimi-
lation as a goal has sharpened this concern.
As the suburbs become more crowded, duplicating the congestion
and other ills of the city, residents begin to ask where this will end
and whether there are limits. Understandably they associate these
conditions with the influx of additional population, and they seek to
stem or stop it. And certainly unchanged land use and development
patterns will in fact result in this cycle repeating itself as new resi-
dents continue to come into California. The two alternatives, if
strong population growth continues, are new forms of urban develop-
ment, or acceptance of increased congestion, lessened air quality,
and other quality of life factors. Alternatively, immigration, the ma-
jor driver in California's population growth, could be curbed.
There has already been some testing of "limits." The Southern
California Association of Governments (SCAG) completed a popula-
tion model in the mid-1980s which projected five million more people
in the Los Angeles basin, raising the population from thirteen mil-
lion to eighteen million. This model predicted that the region could
not absorb the additional population without exceeding regional en-
vironmental and infrastructure capacity. Mandated air quality stan-
dards would be violated even with increased mass transit and
decreased automobile emissions. Existing stationary source controls
would prohibit the building of sufficient housing and economic devel-
opment to support the projected population increases. SCAG is now
seeking new forms of urban development (and not growth limitation
measures) as an alternative to this "overcrowding" of the basin.
Other similar efforts are sure to follow.
California's continuing fiscal crisis has now moved the focus from
the environmental impacts of population growth to the fiscal impacts
of immigration, particularly illegal immigration. The two are closely
related, however. The following section examines the central role of
immigration in population growth and in added state and local gov-
ernment costs.
III. COMPONENTS OF GROWTH
Different components have made up California's recent population
growth. According to the California Department of Finance, the
breakdown of the state's population increase during 1980 to 1990
was: domestic migration, 1,125,000 or 18 %; foreign immigration,
2,275,000 or 37%; natural increase (births over deaths), 2,794,000
or 45%; total population growth, 6,194,000 or 100%. These compo-
nents changed over time.' By 1992, under the weight of the reces-
sion, defense cuts, and job losses in California, domestic migration
had ceased to be a factor and in fact turned negative; the primary
factors were immigration (roughly 45%) and natural increase
(roughly 55%), which in turn was largely fueled by higher birth
rates among immigrants. Immigration has remained strong because,
even in a recession, U.S. social services and economic opportunity,
particularly in California, are relatively more attractive than in
many foreign countries.
A. Domestic Migration
A relatively small proportion of California's growth in the recent
past came from residents (both citizens and non-citizens) from other
states moving to California, and even this now appears to have
stopped. The proportional distribution of this new population varies
annually, but in the last ten years less than twenty percent of popu-
lation growth came from such domestic migration. In 1991, the Cali-
fornia Department of Finance stated that domestic in-migration had
dwindled to almost nothing (net in-migration totalled 26,000), and
1991-1992 figures showed net out-migration.3 Some domestic in-mi-
gration in any event is secondary foreign immigration, that is, immi-
grants relocating from other states. Such secondary immigration is
2. The percentages for the second half of this period, 1985 to 1990, were domestic
migration, 23%; natural increase, 44%; and immigration, 33%.
3. It is important to note that this is net. There may still be large domestic popula-
tion movements in and out of the state. In fact, California may suffer from net tax pro-
ducers moving out while net tax consumers move in. See CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF FINANCE,
CALIFORNIA'S TAXPAYER SQUEEZE (1991).
In data on driver's license changes released August 31, 1993, the Demographic Re-
search Unit of the California Department of Finance estimated that 583,000 Californi-
ans left the state during fiscal year 1993 (July 1992 - June 1993), the biggest exodus in
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probably more common among refugee populations, whose initial
settlement locations are involuntary. For example, California has re-
ceived thirty-five percent of all Southeast Asian refugees since 1980,
but secondary migration raises the estimate to one-half.'
Domestic migration cannot be restricted legally. The U.S. Su-
preme Court has upheld a constitutional implied right to travel, and
by further implication there is a right to reside. Numerous court de-
cisions forbid discrimination between new residents and long-term
residents of the same state. In addition, the economic foundations of
the U.S. market-based economy, as well as the interstate commerce
clause of the U.S. Constitution, require that people and businesses
be allowed freedom to build, invest, and create wealth without undue
restrictions between the various states.
B. Foreign Immigration
Approximately one-third or more of California's recent annual
growth has come from direct (immediate) foreign immigration, both
legal and illegal, primarily from Mexico, Central America, and Asia.
Because secondary migration is hidden in domestic migration and
immigration's role in natural increase, the overall impact of foreign
immigration is probably substantially higher. However, California
has no legal authority to regulate foreign immigration, which is an
area preempted by federal law, although largely uncompensated by
federal dollars.'
Because net domestic migration to California appears to have
the two decades since 1970 in which such records have been kept. The net loss was
150,000. Actual driver's license address changes (DLAC) moving out of state were
389,275, up 10%; DLAC in-state was 289,373, down 15%. Net DLAC was -99,902, as
compared to -13,060 in fiscal year 1992. DEMOGRAPHIC RESEARCH UNIT. CALIFORNIA
DEP'T OF FINANCE, NOTES ON DRIVERS' LICENSE ADDRESS CHANGE REPORT FY 1993
(noting that at the time of the 1990 Census there were an estimated 1.5 persons per
license).
4. DEMOGRAPHIC RESEARCH UNIT, CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF FINANCE, REPORT SR
91-92. ESTIMATES OF REFUGEES IN CALIFORNIA COUNTIES AND THE STATE: 1991 AND
1992 (1994).
5. The federal government is vested with the sole and exclusive responsibility of
protecting the borders of the United States of America and legislating with respect to
aliens. U.S. CONsT. art. I; see also Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410,
419 (1948); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 378 (1971); Mathews v. Diaz, 426
U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976). Because regulation of immigration is an exclusively federal func-
tion, a state has little power to protect its economy or its ability to provide services from
the effects of either legal or illegal immigration. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
In addition, as Justice Powell noted in his concurrence in Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,
236 (1982), the federal government has largely failed to deal effectively with the flood of
illegal immigration. Id. at 237.
slowed to a trickle and even reversed, and because high birth rates
appear directly related to immigrant populations, immigration is un-
doubtedly the primary driver in California's continuing rapid popula-
tion growth (some 442,000 in 1993, despite the state's economic
woes). 6 The federal government's failure to compensate California
for its disproportionate impact from national immigration policies is
in turn a primary factor in the state's continuing fiscal crisis. The
next section examines the immigration phenomenon in greater detail.
C. Natural Increase
The largest immediate component of California's growth is natu-
ral increase (net of births over deaths). As with domestic migration,
some of this growth again can be directly attributed to foreign immi-
gration, whose cultural norms include larger families than are the
norm in this country. This phenomenon probably will lessen over
time as succeeding generations become more assimilated to Ameri-
can culture, but in the meantime new waves of immigration may
repeat the same effect.
There is little doubt that the immigrant population accounts for a
larger share of natural increase than its percent of the total state
population. California Department of Finance data from 1992 for
California's fertility rates for different ethnic groups indicates 1.74
for Anglos, 2.48 for Blacks, 3.33 for Hispanics, and 2.15 for Asians,
for a total of 2.42, or sixteen percent higher than the current na-
tional average. Demographers consider 2.1 to be the replacement
rate.
This represents a startling rise of 23.5 % in just nine years, during
a period in which there has been heavy immigration to California. In
1991, forty-three percent of the births in California were to foreign-
born women, almost twice the foreign-born share of the state's popu-
lation. California Department of Finance analysis confirms this
conclusion:
Although between 1950 and 1980 fertility between California and the na-
tion did merge, a sharp divergence began during the 1980's. While the na-
tion's fertility was flat, fertility in California rose sharply. The majority of
this divergence was due to California's greater race/ethnic diversity and the
fertility differences among these groups.
7
A recent article noted: "With immigrants accounting for about
half of the state's growth and contributing to the other half with
high birth rates, California's population has risen at an average of
6. There has been a slight rise in domestic birth rates due to deferred childbearing,
but arithmetically this cannot have been more than a minor factor.
7. DEMOGRAPHIC RESEARCH UNIT, CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF FINANCE, REPORT 93 P-
5. BIRTH PROJECTS FOR CALIFORNIA STATE AND COUNTIES 2 (1993).
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2.2% a year since 1980, a rate faster than China, India, or Indone-
sia and in some years as fast as Bangladesh." 8
It is this combination of immigration and fertility that also ac-
counts for startling changes in school age populations. According to
California Department of Finance figures, between 1984 and 1992,
public school enrollment in California grew by 1,011,065, or on aver-
age by 126,000 children each year (all years were not average, how-
ever; later years have seen smaller numbers, 88,138 in 1992, for
example). The increase has been 69% Hispanic, 19% Asian, 3%
Pacific Islanders and American Indians, 5 % Anglo, and 4 % black.
IV. IMMIGRATION
A. Numbers of Foreign-Born
California has the largest population of foreign-born persons (in-
cluding both legal and illegal immigrants) of any state, as many as
7.4 million of the state's nearly thirty-two million people. Foreign
births is perhaps the most convenient measure of historical immigra-
tion to California over the long run, as it treats the entire current
population and avoids debates over when one ceases to become an
immigrant.
With twelve percent of the nation's population, California had
twenty-five percent of the total national population of foreign-born
persons in 1980. During the 1980s the state received twenty-six per-
cent of legal foreign immigration, or 2,787,792 persons according to
the U.S. Census Bureau, and roughly half of illegal immigration. A
Census report released December 18, 1992 reported that California
was home to almost one-third of all foreign-born U.S. residents as of
April 1, 1990, using a figure of 6.5 million (a doubling in one dec-
ade) or 21.7% the state's population, up from eight percent in
1960.9
However, this figure does not include what most regard as a con-
tinuing Census undercount, particularly of illegal immigrants. The
Census Bureau's Director has conceded an estimated 1990 un-
dercount in total population of at least 1.6% - undoubtedly larger
8. Vlae Kershner, A Hot Issue for the '90s California Leads in Immigration-and
Backlash, S.F. CHRON., June 21, 1993, at Al [hereinafter Immigration-and Backlash].
The director of a group called Californians for Population Stabilization noted, "It's the
worst possible scenario. We have the population growth rates of the Third World and the
resource consumption of the First World." Id. at Al, A6.
9. Percentage of Foreigners in U.S. Rises Sharply, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1992,
§ 1, at 36.
for California because of its large foreign population - but appar-
ently determined not to make a correction for legal considerations. 10
It is in fact impossible to accurately determine the non-citizen
population in California. In almost every case, estimates of foreign
population in California have been lower than the actual numbers.
The most recent count, in the 1990 U.S. Census, was 2,017,610 nat-
uralized citizens and 4,441,215 non-citizens, for a total of 6,458,825.
The Demographic Research Unit of the California Department of
Finance (DOF) estimates that nearly one million of these people
(975,000) were illegal. In addition, DOF estimates a total of 325,000
additional illegal immigrants for 1991, 1992, and 1993. Another
608,000 persons are estimated as legal immigrants during those
three years, according to Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) figures and California DOF estimates. This would make the
total number of foreign-born in California 7,391,825 in 1993, or
about 23.3%. Of these, an estimated 6.1 million are legal immi-
grants and 1.3 million are illegal. Obviously, these figures may in-
crease with continued immigration.
The number of legal immigrants includes a total of 1.5 million
persons in California legalized as a result of the 1986 Immigration
Reform and Control Act (IRCA). The IRCA legislation allowed two
categories of previously illegal immigrants in California to become
legal residents through the process of amnesty: those who were here
before 1982; and special agricultural workers (SAWS, also alterna-
tively referred to as replenishment agricultural workers, or RAW),
those engaged in farm employment for at least ninety days between
May 1985 and May 1986. Some 900,000 pre-1982 illegal immi-
grants had been approved for residency as of August 1992, along
with 550,000 SAWS. SAWS applications turned out to be five times
the entire number of seasonal agricultural workers in California, ac-
cording to the Employment Development Department. The total
number of IRCA amnesty applications in California was approxi-
mately 1,636,000, far higher than anticipated.
California has received more immigrants in recent years than any
other state in the union. In fiscal year 1991, according to the INS,
California was the intended state of residence for fully 40% of legal
immigrants (47.9% of legalization immigrants and 27.6% of
others)." Eleven of the top twenty metropolitan areas of intended
residence, including three of the top five, were in California. The
10. Felicity Barringer, U.S. Population Passes 256 Million, Bureau Says, N.Y.
TIMs, Dec. 30, 1992, at A12.
11. The high incidence of legalization immigrants is possibly misleading because
such immigrants were already here, although these numbers will come into play (and
have already) when legalization immigrants become eligible to bring family members
into the United States.
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U.S. Census Bureau estimates that more than three in ten of all im-
migrants to the United States from July 1991 to July 1992 settled in
California. Other estimates, however, are higher. According to
Georges Vernez, thirty-seven percent of what he calculates as Cali-
fornia's 6.1 million population growth in the 1980s was foreign im-
migration. Of the 8.9 million legal immigrants to the United States
since 1980, 3.2 million - more than a third - came to California,
more than to New York, Texas, Florida, and Illinois combined,
states that are often lumped in with California as having the biggest
immigration problems. More than half of the three million amnesty
immigrants were in California. The state has received 655,000 politi-
cal refugees since 1986, almost one-half the national total. One in
three in the Los Angeles-Long Beach statistical area is now foreign,
and one in five in the Anaheim-Santa Ana area. 2 Immigrants now
comprise a larger share (more than twenty percent) of the state's
population than at any time since at least 1920.
A City of Los Angeles analysis of Census data found that forty-
four percent of the city's adults were born in another country, in-
cluding thirty-eight percent of the adults in the San Fernando Val-
ley, an area traditionally thought of as white suburbia.' Three in
ten adults spoke a language other than English at home. The num-
ber of Asians tripled from 1980 to 1990, while the number of Lati-
nos doubled.
B. Projected Future Growth in Foreign-Born Population
In order to determine likely foreign-born population growth in the
immediate future, it is instructive to look at growth in the immediate
past. The components of California's average yearly growth in the
late 1980s were as follows:
12. Robert Reinhold, A Welcome for Immigrants Turns to Resentment, N.Y.
TImEs, Aug. 25, 1993, at Al, A12.
13. Dorothy Peters, UNITED PRESS INT'L, Aug. 1, 1993.
Recent statistics reported by the California Department of Fi-
nance show a sharp slowing and then reversal of domestic migration.
From June 1990 to June 1991, domestic migration fell from 207,000
to 26,000. It then fell further to negative 46,000 in fiscal year 1992,
and negative 252,000 in fiscal year 1993.
SOURCES OF GROWTH, ANNUAL AVERAGE INCREASES, 1985-199C
NATURAL INCREASE (BIRTHS MINUS DEATHS) 316,000 44%
NET DOMESTIC MIGRATION 162,000 23%




SOURCE: California Department of Finance, May 1992.
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Overall population statistics for California since 1980 are demon-
strated in the following chart:
ESTIMATES OF POPULATION OF CALIFORNIA





Tota l Natural legtalYear TtlChange Births Deaths - LllneotaeDoestc I
IncreaseI O
1980 23782
1981 24278 496 413 189 224 100 148 248 24 272
1982 24805 527 425 186 239 100 116 216 72 288
1983 25337 532 435 188 247 100 101 201 84 285
1984 25816 479 437 191 246 100 106 206 27 233
1985 26403 587 457 202 255 100 119 219 113 332
1986 27052 649 481 200 281 100 129 229 139 368
1987 27717 665 493 214 287 100 134 234 144 378
1988 28393 676 517 216 303 100 139 239 134 373
1989 29142 749 547 216 331 100 137 237 181 418
1990 29976 834 594 213 381 100 146 246 207 453
Annud 619 480 201 279 100 128 228 113 340
Averag I
1991 30646 670 609 213 396 100 148 248 26 274
1992 31300 654 613 216 397 100 203 303 -46 257
1993 31742 442 587 212 375 100 219 319 -252 67
STota De 1766ahc Re 10 r1 1168 300 of 570 F 870rar -272
Source: Demographic Research Unit, Department of Finance, February 1994
Some demographers believe the slowed economy has made Califor-
nia less attractive for out-of-state migrants. Others cite reasons such
as high business costs, crime and school problems, and greater
congestion.
It remains to be seen whether foreign immigration will also fall.
There are reasons to believe it will not. At least one demographer 4
projects a "high end" range of population of as much as fifty million
people by 2010, with growth driven in large part by high fertility
rates among the immigrant population already here. Others note
that social and economic conditions overseas lead people to immi-
grate to California, and thus that foreign immigration may continue
even if the recession decreases job opportunities here.'
The most recent population growth estimates by the U.S. Census
14. LEON F. BOUVIER, CENTER FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, FIFTY MILLION
CALIFORNIANS? (1991). In addition, a January 1990 State Senate Office of Research
report concluded that IRCA has not stopped illegal immigration over the long run. SEN-
ATE OFFICE OF RESEARCH, REPORT ON SELECTED ISSUES RELATING TO UNDOCUMENTED
PERSONS IN SAN DIEGO (1990).
Bouvier projects a national population of 396 million by the year 2050, given current
immigration trends. LEON F. BOUVIER, CENTER FOR PUBLIC POLICY AND CONTEMPO-
RARY ISSUES, THE DEMOGRAPHY OF AMERICA'S FUTURE 3 (1993) [hereinafter BOUVIER,
DEMOGRAPHY OF AMERICA'S FUTURE]. The U.S. Bureau of the Census projects an in-
crease of 131 million from 252 million in 1992 to 383 million in 2050, with the major
part of the increase Hispanic and Asian. Whites will decline from 75% to 53% of the
population. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, SER. P25, No. 1092, CURRENT POPULATION
REPORTS. POPULATION PROJECTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, BY AGE. SEX. RACE, AND
HISPANIC ORIGIN: 1992 TO 2050, at vii (112th ed. 1992); see also Dennis A. Ahlburg &
James W. Vaupel, Alternative Projection of the United States, 27 DEMOGRAPHY 639,
648-60 (1990) (projecting a possible population of 500 million in 2050 and 811 million
by 2080).
15. Relative population pressure between different parts of the world will also un-
doubtedly continue to play a part. Two of California's principal sources of immigration,
Asia and Latin America, are growing very quickly, somewhat slower than in the recent
past, but still at more than twice the rate of North America. Current doubling times for
population are 43 years for Latin America, 52 years for Asia, and 110 years for North
America. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 14; UNITED NATIONS POPULATION
FUND. THE STATE OF WORLD POPULATION (1993). The population of Mexico is expected
to rise from its current 88 million to 125 million in the next 15 years. Id.
World population, which is growing by 900 million a year, will not stabilize until the
end of the 22nd century, at 11.6 billion, according to senior U.N. population analyst
Armindo Miranda. At the same time, after decades of steady increases, world per capita
food production has recently declined along with increased deforestation, water use, and
topsoil loss. Michael D'Antonio, Apocalypse Soon; The Latest Overpopulation Alarm
Has a Twist: Not Only Lives But Lifestyles are at Stake, LA. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1993,
Magazine, at 18. Increased immigration pressure is one consequence of this deferred
Malthusian dynamic. According to the United Nations Population Fund:
The impact of international migration is far greater than the figures suggest:
numbers are substantially greater than reported; migrants are often in the peak
years of fertility; migrants tend to concentrate in a few areas, increasing their
visibility and the perception of cultural differences; and the economic integra-
tion of migrants is not matched by their social integration in the host society.
• . . [T]he 'migrant profile' has changed significantly from the 1960s when
flows were dominated by skilled and professional workers. Family unification
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Bureau, released April 20, 1994, project a population for California
of 47.9 million by the year 2020. According to the projections, Cali-
fornia will lead the nation in population growth, with 16.5 million
new residents, and increase its share of the U.S. population from
12.2% to 14.7%. Ten million of the new arrivals will be foreign im-
migrants. The Latino share of the population will increase to 36.5 %
(from 27.3% in 1993), while whites will drop to 34% (from 52% in
1993), Asians will increase to roughly 20% and blacks will increase
marginally to 8 %. California's so-called dependency ratio, the num-
ber of young and elderly compared to workers, will continue to in-
crease. Four million Californians will leave for other states. Initial
reaction from the Demographic Research Unit of the California
DOF was to confirm that its projections were similar.
The INS does not track the reasons for immigrants choosing a
particular city or state in which to reside. However, members of the
INS research division believe that the two main reasons for location
decisions are existing family location and existing ethnic communi-
ties. Other reasons no doubt include the traditional motivations for
coming to California, including weather, economic opportunity, and
popular imagery. In addition, the relatively generous government
benefits here (even after recent cuts, California has one of the high-
est welfare levels in the country), together with easy residency re-
quirements, cannot be entirely discounted as factors, although costs,
particularly housing, are higher.
If past trends continue, using a conservative estimate of thirty per-
cent of the seven million legal immigrants who will arrive in the
United States this decade, California could receive 2,100,000 legal
immigrants in the 1990s, or 210,000 per year. To this figure might
be added 100,000 illegal immigrants, assuming that illegal immigra-
tion remains at the same level in the 1990s as in the 1980s, bringing
has been a major influence on the composition of flows in recent years. Increas-
ing numbers of women and undocumented migrants have raised the proportion
of unskilled workers.
UNITED NATIONS POPULATION FUND, supra, at ii. International smuggling of immi-
grants to the United States is on the rise. Pamela Burdman, Smuggling of Immigrants
- No Letup, S.F. CHRON., July 14, 1993, at Al.
Immigration pressures similar to those faced by the United States are leading Western
European nations to restrict entry. In France, the Interior Ministry has said it aims for
"zero immigration." Zero Option, EcONOMIST, June 12-18, 1993, at 57. In Germany, the
Basic Law or Constitution has been amended to restrict the almost universal right of
asylum it offered. Greece is rounding up and deporting illegal Albanian entries, and Italy
is preventing more from arriving. Other nations from Sweden to Austria have pulled out
the welcome mat, particularly in the wake of mass refugees from the disintegration of
Yugoslavia. Bruce W. Nelan, Europe Slams the Door, TIME, July 19, 1993, at 38.
the new immigrant figure to 310,000 annually.16 The evidence to
date seems to bear these estimates out. Since 1990, population
growth in California has slowed but immigration has not. In 1991
and 1992, the state took in 303,000 immigrants and lost a net of
41,000 residents to other states.
The Demographic Research Unit of the California DOF has used
a projected net figure of 300,000 foreign immigrants annually until
the year 2005. These estimates show a small positive domestic mi-
gration in 1990-1991 and net domestic out-migration in 1991-1992
and 1992-1993. Total net migration to California in 1992-1993 was
67,000.
In addition to immigration, continuing social and political upheav-
als around the world, ranging from change and ethnic tension in
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union to the return of Hong Kong to
China, can be expected regularly to generate flows of refugees,
which past history shows the United States will be called upon to
accommodate. Historically, many of these flows, such as from South-
east Asia and Iran, have ended in California. 7 California has been
receiving approximately thirty percent of refugees initially coming
into the country, or approximately 35,000 per year, although this has
been slowing with the increase in Eastern European refugees (and
may also with those from Haiti). This percentage probably increases
with subsequent refugee relocation.
Total annual immigrants and refugees to California in the 1990s
therefore will likely be in the range of 300,000 to 350,000 a year.
However, this could understate the ultimate impact on the state due
to several factors. First, the 465,000 places reserved for regular
16. The usual rough estimate is that California receives one-half of 200,000 annual
illegal immigrants into the United States. However, data in this area is imprecise and
fragmentary. One source calculates a conservative estimate is closer to 300,000. CENTER
FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, IMMIGRATION-RELATED STATISTICS-1993 (June 1993).
In 1993, the Census Bureau in fact updated its estimate to increase annual illegal
immigration to 300,000, the 1980 figure to 3 million, and the 1993 figure to 4 million,








This occurred shortly after the state's Demographic Research Unit had estimated 1.3
million illegal immigrants in January 1993. Tony Bizjak, Trying to Count the Uncount-
able, SACRAMENTO BEE, Aug. 15, 1993, at A5.
17. There has been some recent return activity to Southeast Asia from refugee
camps. Overall, foreigners (both refugees and immigrants) leaving California have aver-
aged 30,000 annually.
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(non-IRCA) family preferences (see discussion below of current im-
migration law) are likely to have a high Mexican and Asian percent-
age, and immigration to California from Mexico and Asia is higher
than the national average. (This was also true in the 1980s, when
California received initially twenty-five percent of national immigra-
tion.) Recent immigrants in general, and Hispanic immigrants in
particular, tend to have high fertility rates. Because of these higher
fertility rates, the immigrant population will then produce larger
numbers of children, who should be factored into growth projections
resulting from immigration.
A second major factor will be the amnesty population. Some 54%
of the nationwide pre-1982 amnesty applications were made in Cali-
fornia, and 53 % of SAWS applications. These populations were
heavily male (57% of pre-1982 applications and 82% of SAWS). 8
As early as November 1992, these immigrants began achieving citi-
zenship and became eligible to bring in family members. This could
have a major impact on California. As soon as the legalization immi-
grants become citizens, five years after obtaining permanent resident
status, their immediate relatives become automatically eligible to
join them in the United States. In addition, unmarried adult children
of citizens have first preference for the regular immigration
proceedings.
It is very difficult to project numbers for such "chain migration,"
since it is hard to predict how soon the legalization immigrants will
go through the process of obtaining citizenship. However, California
could reasonably expect to receive a substantial portion of the
465,000 family reunification immigrants permitted in the country
annually, given the fact that half the IRCA amnesty applications are
in California. Using a conservative figure for California of thirty
percent of permitted family reunification immigrants, this means as
many as 140,000 legal family reunification immigrants could be an-
ticipated annually in the state throughout the 1990s. Calculated an-
other way, if each IRCA-legalized immigrant accounts for one
additional immigrant (the number is not larger because many family
members are already here), the 1.5 million amnesty immigrants
would result in an additional 1.5 million immigrants over the decade.
18. The prominence of single males in SAWS (47%), among illegal immigrants
apprehended by the INS, and to a lesser degree in pre-1982 IRCA populations, means
that the full impact of population growth from higher fertility rates for immigrant popu-
lations is yet to come, when these largely male populations have families. The impact to
date has come largely as a result of previously legal, not illegal immigrants. However,
there is also strong evidence that many SAWS do not live in the United States.
This is consistent with the projection of 140,000 annually, and would
be a subset within the overall immigration figures calculated above.
The initial evidence is that such legal immigration through IRCA
immigrants will be substantial. Legal immigration from Mexico, the
country of origin of the overwhelming number of amnesty immi-
grants, more than doubled in 1991-1992, up 108% from 22,515 to
46,905. Overall legal immigration to California jumped twenty-three
percent, from 193,278 to 237,492. Asians comprised fifty-four per-
cent of this total, a drop of five percent. According to the Demo-
graphic Research Unit, "[m]ost of this change was due to a large
increase in the number of immigrants coming from Mexico to Cali-
fornia . . . due to family reunification of persons who were legalized
in the amnesty . . . program." 19
Updated figures for calendar year 1992 are similar. Under the
1990 amendments to federal immigration law, there was a dramatic
reduction, from fourteen to two years, in the waiting time for immi-
gration of spouses and children of citizens from Mexico and the Phil-
ippines. A total of 810,635 persons then immigrated legally to the
United States in 1992, up fifteen percent from 1991, one of the larg-
est one-year increases since the turn of the century. Fully forty-one
percent of these people, or 336,663, came to California, 129,669 to
the Los Angeles-Long Beach area alone.20 Chain migrations can also
occur in other immigrant categories for which there are "pierceable"
caps in the 1990 Immigration Act. In effect, the number of relatives
who can come in is virtually unlimited.
One caveat, however, may be economic conditions. If the Califor-
nia economy continues to decline, illegal immigration may fall, and
family reunification may be delayed. Typically, the IRCA population
consists of a male working in a lower-skilled job. Economic condi-
tions may lead to slowed growth of these types of jobs, which grew
dramatically in the 1980s. However, California DOF figures showed
continued population growth of 442,000 in 1993, similar to previous
years, despite economic recession and high unemployment.
An unknown factor is the effect of the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Some predict that short-term eco-
nomic dislocation in Mexico as a result of NAFTA, privatization,
and restructuring in the Mexican economy will send fresh waves of
immigration across the border. (This may occur anyway because of
agricultural reforms in Mexico's overpopulated and underemployed
countryside.) Others believe. long-term improvements in the Mexican
19. DEMOGRAPHIC RESEARCH UNIT, CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF FINANCE, LEGAL FOR-
EIGN IMMIGRATION TO CALIFORNIA FISCAL YEAR 1992, at 1 (1993).
20. These figures do not include illegal immigrants, estimated at 200,000 to
300,000 nationally each year. They also do not include a further 163,342 persons granted
legal status under the 1986 amnesty law (IRCA).
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economy will ease immigration to the United States. Of course, both
may be true. In any event, free trade or not, through market forces
low-skill jobs naturally seek low-wage labor; these jobs will either be
exported or willing workers will be imported.
In summary, there is reason to expect another approximately three
million foreign immigrants will arrive in California in this decade, as
well as continued high rates of fertility among immigrants already
here.2'
C. Sources of Immigration
According to the INS, in federal fiscal year 1992, a total of
237,492 legal immigrants came to California. This was a twenty-
three percent increase over the 1991 figure of 193,278. The 1993
figure is expected to show the same level as 1992.
The Demographic Research Unit of the California DOF has tabu-
lated these figures by region of origin as follows. These figures in-
clude legal immigrants, refugees approved and admitted, and asylees
approved. They do not include illegal immigrants, for which no relia-
ble figures are available.
NUMBER AND PERCENT OF IMMIGRANTS TO CALIFORNIA
BY AREA AND FEDERAL FISCAL YEAR OF ENTRY
NUMBER PERCENT FY 91-FY 92
AREA _PERCENT
FY1991 F1 92 IFY 19911 JFY1992f CHANGE
ASIA 114,733 128,549 59 54 12
NORTH AMERICA 42,788 70,077 22 30 64
EUROPE 25,172 27,195 13 11 8
SOUTH AMERICA 4,756 5,642 3 2 19
AFRICA 4,002 4,361 2 2 9
OCEANA 1,827 1,668 1 1 9
TTL193,278, 237,492 ii 100 100 [ 23
Source: Demographic Research Unit, Department of Finance, August 1993, based on data from INS,
Aliens Granted Legal Permanent Residence in the United States, Fiscal Year 1991-1992.
21. Bouvier projects a range of from 3,108,000 to 4,144,000 legal and illegal immi-
grants to California in the 1990s.
According to the Demographic Research Unit, the area with the
largest percentage and numerical change from fiscal year 1991 to
fiscal year 1992 was North America, with a percentage change of
sixty-four and a numerical change of 27,289. Most of this change
was due to a large increase in the number of immigrants coming
from Mexico to California. This increase was due to family reunifi-
cation of persons who were legalized in the amnesty (Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986) program. The number of immi-
grants from Mexico increased 108% from 22,515 to 46,905. Immi-
grants from the former Soviet Union totaled 12,627, a twelve
percent decline from fiscal year 1991.
The Demographic Research Unit also calculated legal immigra-
tion to California by country in federal fiscal year 1992, similarly
based on INS data:
COUNTRIES THAT CONTRIBUTED 2,000 IMMIGRANTS OR MORE IN FY 1992
NUMBER FY 91-FY 92 NUMBER Y 91- FY 92
NUME PERCENT AREA9F PERCENT
COUNTRY FY FY CHANGE COUNTRY FY FY CHANGE
1991 1992 1991119921
ASMA 114,733 128,549 12 EVOLYE 25,172 27,195 8
Vietnam 21.457 33.367 56 Armenia NA 5.920 NA
Philippines 25.935 25,149 -3 United Kingdom 2,591 4.030 56
China 11,891 11,565 -3 Ukraine NA 2.327 NA
Mainland
Taiwan 5.509 7.470 36 All Other 22.581 14.918 -34
India 5.857 6.915 18
Iran 10.874 6,817 -37 NOR AMERICA 42,788 70.077 64
Korea 6.461 5,790 -10 Mexico 22,515 46.905 108
Hong Kong 4.405 4.509 2 El Salvador 7,444 11,827 59
Laos 4.779 4,409 -8 Guatemala 2,698 3.940 46
Japan 1.580 4.073 158 Canada 1,906 2.201 15
Thailand 3.068 3.376 10 Nicaragua 5,1551 2.125 -59
All Other 12,917 15,109 17 All Other 3.070 3,079 0
Source: Demographic Research Unit, Department of Finance. Legal Foreign Immigration to California
Fiscal Year 1992, at 2,/August 1993, based on data from INS. Aliens Granted Legal Permanent Residence
in the United States. Fiscal Year 1991-1992.
According to the INS, forty-six percent of immigrants were male
and fifty-four percent were female. The median age of immigrants in
fiscal year 1992 was 27.7, compared to 30.0 in fiscal year 1991. Al-
most half of the new immigrants were in the 19 to 44 age group in
fiscal year 1992. Few immigrants are over the age of sixty-five.
PERCENT AGE DISTRIBUTION OF IMMIGRANTS
BY YEAR OF ENTRY
YA AGEYEAR <19 19-44 45-64 65+ _TOTAL
FY1991 27 I 50 I 16 I 7 I 100
FY1992 32 49 14 5 100
Source: Demographic Research Unit, Department of Finance, Legal Foreign Immigration to
California Fiscal Year 1992, at 2, August 1993, based on data from INS, Aliens Granted Legal
Permanent Residence in the United States, Fiscal Year 1991-1992.
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For that portion of the immigrant population age sixteen and over,
half were homemakers, retired, students, or unemployed, while a
quarter were in professional or technical employment, fourteen per-
cent were employed in blue-collar industries, eight percent were in
service industries, and three percent were in farming or fishing
industries.
As noted, none of the above figures include illegal immigration
after IRCA was enacted in 1986. No reliable figures are available.
However, as stated above, estimates of this flow are in the 200,000 to
300,000 range annually. It also stands to reason that the breakdown
of illegal immigration is likely heavily skewed toward Mexico and
Central America because of the proximity and porousness of the bor-
der. The U.S. General Accounting Office as of August 1993 esti-
mated that the "likely maximum" number of illegal aliens in the
United States is 3.4 million. Other sources have estimated that there
were 1,283,000 illegal immigrants residing in California as of Octo-
ber 1992, with 596,000 from Mexico, 187,000 from El Salvador,
83,000 from Guatemala, 142,000 from Asia, and 45,000 from Eu-
rope. Also in 1993, the Census Bureau updated its own estimate to
four million illegal immigrants nationally, and 2.1 million in
California.
D. Changes in Immigration Law
Previous federal immigration and refugee law (pre-1990) admitted
approximately 580,000 immigrants and refugees annually into this
country. This included 270,000 "general" immigrants - 216,000
admissions for immigrants with family members in the United
States, and 54,000 admissions for individuals (and their families)
with special employment skills. In addition, immediate relatives of
U.S. citizens could be admitted with no numerical ceiling; this cate-
gory has numbered approximately 220,000 annually. "Immediate
relatives" are spouses, minor children, and parents. The final cate-
gory for admission is refugee status. This number is set each year by
statute and has been approximately 125,000 annually, although the
actual number of refugee immigrants has been approximately 90,000
annually during the past five years.
Immigration law was changed, effective in 1990, to sharply in-
crease the number of immigrants allowed into the country from the
prior limit of 490,000 (270,000 general immigrants, 220,000 imme-
diate relatives), to the new annual limit of 700,000 immigrants
(675,000 after 1994). Of this number, 520,000 of these places are
reserved for family preferences (480,000 after 1994), of which some
25,000 visas were reserved for families of legalized IRCA immi-
grants for fiscal years 1992 through 1994.22 Immediate relatives of
U.S. citizens, while still given automatic entry, are now counted as a
part of the 520,000 family preference visas. However, if immediate
family visas exceed 294,000, there will continue to be at least
226,000 visas available for other family preferences such as brothers,
sisters and adult children (i.e., the 520,000 cap is "pierceable").
Another 140,000 visas are reserved for immigrants with special
employment skills, or unskilled laborers in industries in which there
is a shortage of U.S. laborers. The number of those actually admit-
ted under this preference rose from 59,525 in 1991 to 116,198 in
1992. Of these 140,000 employment-based visas, 10,000 are availa-
ble for those individuals who invest at least $1 million in new com-
mercial enterprises that employ at least ten people. This section of
the bill was included with the knowledge that a number of Hong
Kong businessmen would be trying to leave the colony before it re-
verts to Chinese control in 1997. Only fifty-seven people applied
under this provision in 1992.
The final 40,000 visas are reserved to "increase the diversity" of
the immigrant pool. This is achieved by making special allowances
for individuals from countries with a small number of immigrants to
the United States, a provision which was enacted into law with the
support of Senator Edward Kennedy (with an eye to immigration
from Ireland).
Refugees are still a separate class of immigrants, and their num-
bers will continue to be addressed separately. Assuming annual aver-
age refugee numbers remain at 90,000, this will make the total
annual immigration under the new 1990 law approximately 800,000.
A final class of legal immigrants includes those claiming asylum,
fleeing a "well-founded fear of persecution" in their home countries.
This category is not limited, and theoretically, at least under the
Bush Administration's prior interpretations, could include all 1.2 bil-
lion Chinese fleeing their country's one-child-per-family population
22. One of the intentions of Congress in adopting the 1990 reforms was to alleviate
the backlog of visa applicants seeking reunification with their family members who were
legalized under IRCA. To that end, Congress inflated the total immigration figures for
the first three fiscal years by 25,000 and set aside 55,000 visas specifically for these
reunification applicants (raising the overall family reunification figure from 465,000 to
520,000). Congress assumed that after three years the backlog would be eliminated.
Consequently, provisions were included in the 1990 reforms to eliminate the special set-
aside for IRCA reunification in 1995, requiring instead that such applications be
processed along with other family preference visas. To offset the increased demand which
is sure to result, the Immigration Act increases the allocation of family preference visas
in 1995 from 465,000 to 480,000. Additionally, the overall immigration cap will be re-
duced in 1995 by 25,000, from 700,000 to 675,000. See 136 CONG. REc. S17,106 (1990)
(statement of Sen. Kennedy).
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control policy. It is also a category which is widely acknowledged to
be abused. In the mid-1980s, on the order of magnitude, 20,000 peo-
ple a year claimed asylum in the United States; in 1992 the figure
was more than 103,000, and the projection for 1993 was 120,000.
The backlog of asylum cases for hearing is now some 300,000, with
only 150 officers to hear them. California alone had 110,407 asylum
applications pending as of October 1, 1992. As one commentator put
it, this is a long way from the defecting Russian ballerina whom the
law's drafters probably had in mind.
Claimants are often released before a hearing and disappear. Re-
vised asylum guidelines in July 1990 have continued to be abused."3
The situation has led to U.S. officials pleading with Mexico to let a
boatload of illegal Chinese immigrants land there, since if they
landed in the United States they could claim asylum and effectively
stay indefinitely.24
Perhaps an additional category should be considered of those im-
migrants who are here illegally and who are apprehended, but who
then stymie deportation because of system abuse similar to asylum.
According to a recent article, the INS fails to deport three out of
four immigrants ordered out of the country. The sheer number of
illegal immigrants is overwhelming the system. "So the pressure
builds and we start releasing," said one officer.25 The lack of money
to process deportations is also critical. Nearly 10,000 law enforce-
ment officers, including Border Patrol agents, special agents, inspec-
tors, and examiners, send cases to just 276 deportation officers
nationwide. From 1988 to 1992, the nationwide deportation caseload
increased from 133,000 to 200,000. Many awaiting hearings disap-
pear or fail to appear. In 1989, the Federal General Accounting Of-
fice found that very few illegal immigrants were deported, and a
quarter failed even to attend their hearings. Non-criminals are re-
leased first, but so are some criminals. 6
23. They're Coming, EcONOMIST, July 24-30, 1993, at 23, 23-24; Patrick J. Mc-
Donnell & William J. Eaton, Political Asylum System Under Fire, Faces Revision, L.A.
TIMEs, July 19, 1993, at Al, A14.
24. Our Lax Asylum Laws Reform of Fundamental Flaws are Necessary, SAN
DIEGO UNION-TRIB., July 14, 1993, at BS.
25. Pamela Burdman, Deportations Stymied--Sheer Number of Illegals, S.F.
CHRON., Aug. 17, 1993, at Al.
26. Id.
E. Immigration on the National Level
The current sustained level of immigration to the United States is
the highest in U.S. history and unprecedented in its ethnic and cul-
tural composition. Bouvier describes the numbers and make-up:
Immigration reached a then historical peak in the 1905-1914 period, when
about eight million people moved here. . . . After 1920 immigration to the
United States fell substantially, and it was not until the 1950s that it in-
creased again. The 1965 amendments to the Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Law signaled the beginning of an "immigrant boom" that has had and
will have significant consequences for the nation.
27
Since 1968 immigration levels have soared, and in the 1980s the number
of newcomers surpassed that noted in 1905-1914. When even a conservative
estimate is made of illegal entries, the total number entering the country
over the 1980s exceeded nine million. . . . In marked contrast to the first
decade of the 20th century when about 85 percent of all immigrants came
from Europe, by the 1980s only 15 percent came from Europe while some
80 percent came from Latin America, the Caribbean, and Asia. . . . The
76 percent Anglo share of the 1990 [national] population marked a sub-
stantial reduction from the 85 percent share in 1950.28
A Newsweek cover story in mid-1993, in which a survey found
that sixty percent of Americans thought immigration now hurt the
country although it was a good thing in the past, described what it
termed the immigration backlash. Largely as a result of increased
levels of immigration, the annual population increase in the United
States (more than three million a year) is by far the highest in the
industrialized world. We admit more legal immigrants than the rest
of the world combined.29
These changes are reflected in California at the state level. The
number of immigrants has increased rapidly in the last decade, and
the composition has changed. More immigrants entered California in
the 1980s than in the five previous decades. One in four California
residents is now foreign-born, versus one in six a decade ago. There
has been a decline in the level of education. Along with an increas-
ing concentration in a few states, the new wave of immigrants is
concentrated in only a handful of major metropolitan areas. One in
three of the new immigrants goes to California. Of these, three in
five go to Los Angeles metropolitan area, which means that the Los
Angeles area is home to fully one-fifth of the nation's immigration.
27. Ironically, the 1965 amendments were advertised specifically as avoiding the
very effects they proved to have. Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.) agreed, "First,
our cities will not be flooded with a million immigrants annually. Under the proposed
bill, the present level of immigration remains substantially the same. Secondly, the ethnic
mix will not be upset. Contrary to charges in some quarters, [the bill] will not inundate
America with immigrants from any one country or area, or the most populated and de-
prived nations of Africa and Asia." Hearings on H.R. 2580 Before the Subcomm. on
Immigr. of the Senate Comm. on Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
28. BOUVIER, DEMOGRAPHY OF AMERICA'S FUTURE, supra note 14, at 2-3.
29. Tom Morganthau, America: Still a Melting Pot?, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 9, 1993,
at 16.
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One-third of Los Angeles County and forty percent of the City of
Los Angeles is foreign-born."
Bouvier estimates that California took 34.54% of the legal immi-
gration in the 1980s, or 2,331,300 of 6,750,200 people. Next highest
was New York with 14.21 %; Texas with 8.81 %; Florida with
6.51%; Illinois with 5.94%; and New Jersey with 3.94%. a1
This massive increase in immigration occurred despite the lack of
an express policy rationale. In March 1981 the Hesburgh Commis-
sion, a Select Committee on Immigration and Refugee Policy, had
reported that immigration was "out of control." It noted, "this is not
the time for a large-scale expansion in legal immigration." Yet
within ten years, there were two major immigration reforms - the
1986 IRCA law which legalized nearly three million illegal aliens,
and the 1990 amendments increasing legal immigration, which,
along with a major and continuing influx of illegal entries, led to the
highest immigration levels in U.S. history. 2 The 1990 changes alone
raised the limit for legal immigrants by forty percent to 700,000 a
year, more than the rest of the world put together.
V. IMMIGRATION COSTS AND MANDATES
Large-scale immigration is imposing enormous financial burdens
on California and, in particular, on its largest county, Los Angeles,
home to thirty percent of the state's population. The California
Health and Welfare Agency has estimated that the state hosts
nearly forty percent of the nation's refugees, fifty-four percent of
amnesty immigrants, more than fifty percent of illegal immigrants,
and is the intended state of residence for forty percent of all legal
immigrants. California has approximately twelve percent of the na-
tion's population. 33 A recent series of independent studies in South-
ern California's most populous counties, including Orange, San
30. Georges Vernez, From Bonanza to Headache: Immigration in California has
Changed Character, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Oct. 15, 1993, at B7.
31. POPULATION-ENVIRONMENT BALANCE. BALANCE DATA/STATE BY STATE IMMI-
GRATION INTO THE UNITED STATES IN THE 1990s (Washington D.C., Aug. 1992).
32. Faced with a similar situation in Canada, one Canadian commentator has writ-
ten, "The most glaring defect in the government's mass immigration program is the ab-
sence of any reasonable explanation for it .... Whether Canada takes in 250,000 or
50,000 immigrants annually will have virtually no effect on third world population, but a
high rate of immigration is having a major impact on Canada." Michael Valpy, It's Not
Racist to Discuss Immigration, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Sept. 16, 1993.
33. CALIFORNIA HEALTH AND WELFARE AGENCY, A FAILED FEDERAL PROMISE
(1993).
Diego, Los Angeles, and Ventura, showed marked and disproportion-
ate fiscal impacts from a growing immigrant and refugee population.
These impacts are largely uncompensated by the federal
government.
It is important not to blame these costs on legal immigrants, who
merely follow the rules we make. Illegal immigrants, by contrast,
know they break the laws of their host country. Immigrants histori-
cally have built this country, and continue to make important contri-
butions, not least of which are drive and work ethic (and indeed,
often stronger family structures than exist in the resident popula-
tion). We should want legal new arrivals to this country to be suc-
cessful. To be successful, they need help. California cannot, and
should not be asked to, provide this help alone.
Instead, the blame is the federal government's, which effectively is
asking California to pay for national immigration and refugee poli-
cies as much as four times out of proportion to its population.
VI. COUNTY COSTS
A. Los Angeles County
In April 1991, the Chief Administrative Officer of Los Angeles
County released memoranda detailing the costs of illegal immigra-
tion. According to the study, 62.6% of all births in Los Angeles
County's public and contract hospitals in fiscal year 1990-1991 were
to illegal immigrants, up from 54.9 % in fiscal year 1988-1989. One-
half of the $249.1 million federal share of AFDC in the county went
to these children. Net estimated county costs for public health, edu-
cation and welfare benefits to these families totalled $276.2 million
in 1990-1991, an increase of a third in just one year, from $207.2
million in 1989-1990.
A November 1992 report by the Los Angeles County Internal Ser-
vices Department suggested that the county's total immigrant popu-
lation of 2.3 million imposed large net costs on county government.
According to the study, Los Angeles county paid $946.7 million in
1991-1992, or 30.9 % of total County costs, to provide public services
to recently arrived immigrants (legal immigrants, illegal immigrants
and their children, and amnesty immigrants), who in turn paid $4.3
billion in taxes to federal, state, and county governments. Only $139
million of this amount, or 3.2% (10% of county revenue), went to
the county for a net cost to the county of $308 million, $2.6 billion
(60%) went to the federal government, $1.2 billion (27%) to the
state, and $356 million (8 %) to other local entities.
In total, immigrants paid 8.7 % of total taxes despite a twenty-five
percent share of the population, indicating the relatively lower wage
scales of many immigrant jobs, and suggesting that, at least in the
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short term, the net per capita contribution of immigrants is less than
a third of that of non-immigrants - 35 cents generated per dollar of
public services consumed, versus $1.22 for non-immigrants. Illegal
immigrants (700,000 of the total) received $308.4 million in county
services, and paid only $36.2 million in county taxes, but an addi-
tional $777 million to the state and federal governments.
The report found that immigrants constituted 25 % of the popula-
tion, accounted for 23 % of spending in the criminal justice system,
21 % in the social services, and 68 % in the county public health
system. These costs totalled 30.9% of county expenditures. Educa-
tion costs were estimated at $1.485 billion, or 23 % of the total costs
in Los Angeles County school districts. Of these costs, $368 million
(5.7 % of total school spending) was for illegal immigrant children
and $662 million (10.3%) was for citizen children of illegal immi-
grants. No figures were given for state or federal services and
impacts.
These numbers support the notion that, with the notable exception
of public health services where immigrants' use is three times their
share of the population (see table below), for other county services
and for education, immigrants do not use more than their "fair
share" of resources according to population. However, they do use
more than their "fair share" according to tax contributions.
The revenue and expenditure figures show a cost-benefit ratio for
the county of 3.1 for the immigrant population (i.e., $3.10 spent for
each $1.00 of taxes), versus 0.77 (i.e., 77 cents spent for each $1.00
of taxes) for the non-immigrant population. This means that the net
cost of county services is four times more expensive for immigrants
than for non-immigrants. Without full federal assistance, the effect
is that the non-immigrant population is heavily subsidizing the costs
of immigration, both legal and illegal. Alternatively, local taxpayers
are subsidizing employers of cheap labor. 4
Another county study identified a mismatch between tax receipt
and service provision as the main culprit, finding that immigrants in
34. The liberal Urban Institute in Washington D.C. has criticized the Los Angeles
County study because, the Institute asserts, natives and long-term residents also cost
government more than they pay. (Actually, this is not supported by the figures in the Los
Angeles County study.) However, it reached the same basic conclusion: the per capita
cost to county government of recent immigrants is higher than for the rest of the popula-
tion. In addition, the criticism identified no evident reason in the first place to accept any
greater financial burden than already exists. Greg Miller, Immigrant Costs Overstated,
Study Finds, L.A. TIMEs, Sept. 3, 1993, at B1, B4; Vlae Kershner, Think Tank Hits
L.A. Study of Immigrant Costs, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 3, 1993, at A17.
Los Angeles County paid $4.3 billion in taxes to all levels of govern-
ment in 1991-1992, but only $139.1 million went to the county. The
county paid out $947 million in services, with schools costing an ad-
ditional $1.5 billion.36
A subsequent study by Julian Simon asserts that both the Los An-
geles County study and Huddle's studies (see below) are wrong, cit-
ing a variety of other studies from 1970 and 1980 Census data, and
even earlier to 1960. "Immigrants do not abuse the welfare system,
nor do they steal jobs from native-born Americans," the study says.
Simon as well suggests the basic problem is one of tax distribution
between levels of government. 6
Healthcare is an area of particular concern. Fiscal year 1993-1994
Medi-Cal costs for illegal aliens statewide are estimated at $880 mil-
lion, three times the cost figure of $299.4 million only four years
earlier, in fiscal year 1989-1990. These costs are concentrated in a
few counties, with Los Angeles County alone home to more than
half the estimated illegal population, more than 700,000 people and
growing by 66,000 a year. Most of the care is provided by the
county's six public hospitals and forty-five health centers. Two-thirds
of the births in Los Angeles County public hospitals are to illegal
aliens. Although illegal immigrants form an estimated 7.6 % of the
county population, they use $159.5 million or nearly a third of
county indigent healthcare expenses, in addition to $273.7 million of
Medi-Cal expenses, for a total of $433.2 million.
The following figures show the disproportionate use of county
healthcare dollars by all immigrants, legal and illegal, in Los Ange-
les County.
% OF POPULATION v. % OF HEALTHCARE COSTS
Children of
Illegal Immigrants 2.7 v. 6.8
Recent Legal 6.9 v. 23.7
Immigrants
Illegal Immigrants 7.6 v. 29.6
Amnesty Immigrants 7.6 v. 7.6
Rest of Population 75.0 v. 32.2
35. Patrick Lee, Studies Challenge View That Immigrants Harm Economy, L A
TIMES, Aug. 13, 1993, at Al, A33.
36. Julian L. Simon, The Nativists are Wrong, WALL ST. J., Aug. 4, 1993, at A8.
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B. Orange County
Another recent study has examined the uncompensated fiscal im-
pacts of immigration in Orange County.37 The study suggested that,
in the five-year period following the passage of IRCA, Orange
County Medi-Cal caseloads increased 145 % and its AFDC caseload
rose 76 %. The number of children citizen cases doubled in the last
year. Like the later Los Angeles County report, the Orange County
study predicted a substantial further impact on financial assistance
programs because of higher fertility rates and younger age structure
of the immigrant population, and the expiration (beginning in the
spring of 1992) of the five-year IRCA ineligibility period for federal
financial assistance.
The Orange County study also found significant impacts from ref-
ugees, who constitute 24% of all children on AFDC in Orange
County, 30% of all AFDC costs, and more than 50% of all AFDC
cases three years or longer. These costs are exacerbated by the fed-
eral policy of not tying the level of refugee funding to the number of
refugees admitted. The study also noted that the federal government
does not enforce the pledges of financial support by friends or rela-
tives for sponsored immigrants admitted outside the regular quota
system and who are ineligible for federal assistance for their first
three years of U.S. residency. As a result, immigrants in this cate-
gory make up fifteen percent of Orange County's general assistance
caseload. In total, Orange County estimates that it is spending ap-
proximately $9.8 million a year, or forty-four percent of total county
expenditures for public assistance, on immigrants. In other reports,
an estimated $31 million was provided for hospital care for illegal
aliens. Medi-Cal costs doubled from $29.5 million in fiscal year 1990
to $59.8 million in fiscal year 1992.
C. San Diego County
A third major county study, by the State Auditor General, con-
cluded that uncompensated illegal immigration is a considerable bur-
den to San Diego County and probably to the state overall.38 The
Auditor General found that illegal immigrants in San Diego County
- an estimated 200,000, or nine percent of the County's population
37. ORANGE COUNTY SOCIAL SERVICES AGENCY, IMMIGRATION AND FINANCIAL
ASSISTANCE CASELOAD GROWTH (1991).
38. AUDITOR GENERAL, FISCAL IMPACT ANALYSIS OF UNDOCUMENTED IMMI-
GRANTS RESIDING IN SAN DIEGO COUNTY (1992).
- paid a total of $60.5 million annually in local and state taxes, but
incurred $206.4 million in state and local government costs ($105.8
million for criminal justice, $26.6 million in health services, $60.7
million in education and $13.4 million in social services), for a net
cost of $145.9 million. Noting that these estimates were conserva-
tive, the report concluded that if other California counties had the
same cost and revenue structure as San Diego, "the net quantifiable
state and local cost associated with undocumented immigrants
throughout the state is estimated to be approximately $3 billion. ' '31
In another San Diego study, San Diego State University research-
ers Richard Parker and Louis Rea found San Diego County costs of
S244 million ($5 billion for the entire state) for an estimated
220,000 illegal immigrants, up from an estimated $146 million ($3
billion for the state) the year before.40 Parker and Rea found per
capita state and local tax revenues of $270, and costs of $380, for
each illegal immigrant.
D. Ventura County
According to a report dated December 2, 1993 from the Ventura
County Chief Administrative Officer, illegal immigration costs Ven-
tura County's health, welfare, and criminal justice systems approxi-
mately $15 million a year: $11.4 million for health and welfare
services and $3.6 million for criminal justice. County officials earlier
released a study (in November 1993) showing one half of the women
who delivered babies and twenty-seven percent of the patients admit-
ted to the public Ventura County Medical Center were in the United
States illegally.
VII. STATE COSTS
Uncompensated state costs associated with immigration are signif-
icant and substantial. Federal law imposes significant cost mandates
on California in regard to both legal and illegal immigrants, who
settle in disproportionate numbers in California.
A. Medical Care
First, federal legislation requires states to provide a Medicaid pro-
gram (in California's case, Medi-Cal) for illegal immigrants as well
39. An earlier report on such costs in San Diego County suggested they may be
substantial and called for further research. SENATE OFFICE OF RESEARCH, supra note 14.
40. ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION IN SAN DIEGO COUNTY; AN ANALYSIS OF COSTS AND
REVENUES. REPORT TO THE CALIFORNIA STATE SENATE ON BORDER ISSUES (1993).
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as legal immigrants and refugees. Federal law prohibits checking eli-
gibility of illegal immigrants, and therefore claims of poverty in or-
der to qualify for Medi-Cal cannot be confirmed. Illegal immigrants
are exempted from requirements to prove eligibility by supplying so-
cial security numbers or other documentation.4' California also is re-
quired by federal law (Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA)
1986) to pay for approximately half of the cost of providing emer-
gency and pregnancy-related services to undocumented residents
who meet Medi-Cal-related income and other standards of eligibil-
ity. More than 400,000 of these California residents are eligible for
services each month, with associated total costs budgeted for 1992-
1993 at nearly $1 billion, including about $474 million from Califor-
nia's General Fund. This has been the fastest-growing category of
Medi-Cal costs.
In 1993-1994, Medi-Cal costs for illegal immigrants were $811
million, including forty percent (96,000 of 237,000) of births to
Medi-Cal recipients. Labor and delivery services make up a third of
total OBRA Medi-Cal expenditures. Pre-natal care expenses have
been driven from $17.7 million in 1989-1990 to $82 million in 1993-
1994, a 360% increase in four years. This open-ended entitlement is
in contrast to the capped state appropriation for the Access for In-
fants and Mothers (AIM) program, which provides pre-natal and
well-baby care to low-income California families that are legally
resident.
Locally, county governments in California are responsible for pro-
viding basic and emergency health care to indigent adults who do
not meet Medi-Cal eligibility standards. No statewide figures are
available for these costs, including those provided to illegal
immigrants.
B. Education
Second, as a result of the 1982 U.S. Supreme Court decision in
Plyler v. Doe,42 current federal law requires that the children of ille-
gal immigrants be schooled at state expense, and state law, of
course, requires that legal immigrant children be schooled. In Plyler,
the Texas Legislature had enacted a statute withholding state funds
from local districts for the education of children not legally admitted
41. See, e.g., Irene Wielawski, Humanitarian Health Laws Leave Door Open to
Abuse, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1993, at A14.
42. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
into the United States, and authorizing local school districts to deny
enrollment. Texas specifically argued the classification was required
to preserve the state's limited resources for the education of its law-
ful residents. While acknowledging the problem was a direct result
of federal dereliction, the Court concluded, in a 5-4 decision, that
the state of Texas had the responsibility to educate these children.'"
In California, foreign immigration is the driving force behind the
state's substantial school-age population increase, which included ap-
proximately 220,000 additional children in 1992 and some 140,000
in 1993. At current K-12 funding levels of approximately $4,200 per
pupil, this translated to an annual incremental cost of $1 billion.
The California DOF most recently estimated 942,852 immigrant
students in California or nearly nineteen percent of total statewide
enrollment, at a state and local cost of more than $3.6 billion. Illegal
immigrants between the ages of 5 and 17 are estimated to number
456,000 in January 1995, with 392,000 in public classrooms. A July
27, 1993 RAND report found that California has forty-five percent
of all immigrant students, nationwide."'
Uncompensated immigration also sets the education system into a
vicious cycle: unprecedented cultural diversity requires increased re-
sources, expertise, and services; but in fact less money is available
for these because of the press just to keep up with enrollment and
the costs of other social programs. As a result, large urban school
districts fall ever farther behind.
C. Welfare
Together, subsidized healthcare and education constitute two of
the three major cost-drivers in California's rapidly escalating general
fund expenditures. The third is welfare, or AFDC, where despite the
lack of a direct federal mandate, federal law prevents reduction of
benefits below 1989 levels absent a waiver, in order to maintain eligi-
bility for federal funds. State AFDC costs to immigrants (including
refugees) in 1992-1993 were estimated at $401 million.
Illegal immigration is suspected of playing a major role in the
doubling of the AFDC rolls in the 1980s. The November 1992 Los
Angeles County ieport cited above noted that one of the greatest
43. The dissenters, however, added a footnote.
It does not follow, however, that a state should bear the costs of educating
children whose illegal presence in this country results from the default of the
political branches of the Federal Government. . . . If the Federal Government,
properly chargeable with deporting illegal aliens, fails to do so, it should bear
the burdens of their presence here.
Id. at 242 n.l (Burger, J., dissenting).
44. The report, by Lorraine McDowell and Paul Hill, found that immigrant
schoolchildren are clustered in a half-dozen big city school systems, most notably in Cali-
fornia, and that they are being poorly prepared for a place in American society.
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fiscal impacts of illegal immigration has been on AFDC payments to
citizen children of ineligible alien parents who entered the United
States illegally.4 The report noted that the number of these children
in Los Angeles County grew steadily in the early 1980s, dropped
with the enactment of IRCA in 1986, and then began a steady rise
from 40,682 in January 1989 to 97,665 in February 1991. This is
consistent with the report's assertion that IRCA has been ineffective
in arresting illegal immigration, other than in the few immediate
years after its passage.
The report stated a concern that total AFDC payments to these
children and their families could quadruple to $1 billion a year by
the end of the decade, even without further illegal immigration, for a
number of reasons: the number of citizen children will grow because
of the high birth rate and relatively young age of the illegal immi-
grant population; more than 850,000 illegal immigrants have applied
for amnesty in Los Angeles County, and by the end of 1993 all who
have been legalized will be eligible for AFDC; and, finally, under the
1990 Immigration Act, pre-1988 illegal immigrant spouses and chil-
dren of legal immigrants may not be deported, and are permitted to
receive AFDC benefits after five years. Los Angeles County has the
greatest impact from these costs, but the same is true to a lesser
degree throughout California.
Statewide, the number of citizen children on AFDC has increased
nearly 400% in six years, from 40,800 in 1987-1988 to 193,800 in
1994-1995. For 1994-1995, the total AFDC costs for these children
are estimated at $553 million, education costs at $400 million, and
health costs at $157 million. California has not sought federal reim-
bursement for any of these citizen children costs.
D. Migrant Labor
Migrant farm workers, a major category source of employment for
immigrant labor, are another source of immigrant-related costs (al-
though, as is true generally, the economy also realizes a benefit from
immigrant labor). The final report of the State of California's Farm
Worker Services Coordinating Council,46 found that due to chronic
underemployment, California agriculture averaged 350,000 year-
45. A child can become eligible for AFDC even though the parents are here ille-
gally; the mother gets the check. Tom Bethell, Immigration. The Problem is Federal
Rules, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 12, 1993, at M5.
46. STATE OF CALIFORNIA FARM WORKER SERVICES COORDINATING COUNCIL,
COORDINATING CALIFORNIA'S FARM WORKER SERVICES (Nov. 1992).
round equivalent jobs for 900,000 workers. Seventy-seven million
dollars in annual direct, unreimbursed state costs, and $16.9 million
in indirect costs, were identified as spent in 1990-1991 on programs
and services both specifically for farm workers and their families and
on programs and services in agricultural areas likely to serve a sig-
nificant number of farm workers. The report noted:
In addition to the problems associated with chronic underemployment, it
appears that migration patterns may also be changing. Instead of returning
to Mexico, more workers and their families appear to be settling here. If
these trends continue, California farm worker assistance programs are
likely to become immigrant integration programs for up to 100,000 newly
arrived workers each year. The continued immigration of workers and the
chronic underemployment in California are conditions that dramatically im-
pact the plight of the farm worker and the ability of state and local agen-
cies to respond to their needs.
47
E. Prisons and Jails
Finally, in fiscal year 1992-1993, California spent some $243 mil-
lion for the costs of incarcerating illegal immigrants in the state's
correctional system. This includes inmate housing, parole costs for
both standard and summary felon parolees, and illegal aliens in the
California Youth Authority. In the current fiscal year, costs are
$375 million, plus $18 million for illegal juveniles in the California
Youth Authority, and $9.2 million in parole costs. The California
Department of Corrections estimates that about fifteen percent of
the state prison population, all felons, are eligible for deportation.
The U.S. Bureau of Prisons says that more than a quarter of those
felons are in federal prisons. Local prison costs add to this burden.
Los Angeles County prison costs are put at $75 million, exclusive of
apprehension or civil costs; those for San Diego County, where
county officials estimate illegal immigrants commit twelve percent of
the felonies, are $151 million.48 The State Board of Corrections esti-
mates there are about 7,000 illegal immigrants in California jails at
annual costs of more than $117 million.
The California State Legislative Joint Committee on Prison Con-
struction and Operations issued a report entitled The Criminal Alien
47. Id.
48. Part of the problem is asserted procedural requirements: "Illegal immigrants
have the right to criminal counsel at public expense. They have the right to a jury trial
and to judicial appeals. They can appeal a deportation order too. . . . [M]any . . . can-
not be deported. . . . If their country refuses to accept them, or if they can prove that
deportation would endanger their lives, the United States must keep them here." Dianne
Klein, A Hit or Miss Approach to Curbing Deportable Felons, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 27,
1993, at Al.
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on March 22, 1993.19 It reported that the cost of keeping all immi-
grants in state and local California prisons and jails is $497 million,
exclusive of processing, administrative and court costs and losses
from the criminal activity. Twelve to fifteen percent of state inmates,
eight percent of California Youth Authority wards, and nine to
eleven percent of county inmates are immigrants, seventy-five per-
cent of whom are here illegally. Seventy percent are Mexican and
twelve percent are from other Latin American countries. In total,
21,170 of the 109,000 inmates are foreigners (the percentage figure
for federal inmates is even higher, about twenty-six percent of the
population of 76,000). The report concluded: "Absent a federal initi-
ative, California's best option would seem to be to organize and lead
a coalition of 10 to 20 impacted states in pursuit of federal funding
or federal assistance in housing serious alien felons in federal institu-
tions. ' ' 50 The report urged quicker deportation of convicted felons,
leasing unused portions of new state prisons to the federal govern-
ment, tougher sentences for re-entry by deported felons, a $1 to $2
border-crossing fee, and better coordination between the Legislature
and the Governor for a comprehensive legislative approach.
On April 22, 1994, the Clinton Administration asked Congress to
authorize $350 million to California and other states that incarcerate
significant numbers of illegal immigrant prisoners.51 According to
news reports, California will receive approximately $200 million in
the federal fiscal year beginning October 1994, and the state will
spend an estimated $403 million to jail 18,000 non-citizens during
the state's fiscal year beginning July 1994. No actual appropriation,
however, was made.
Prison costs for immigrants may get worse before they get better.
According to a recent article in California Lawyer, the journal of
the California State Bar Association, immigration will undoubtedly
affect the crime rate. Older people, with generally law-abiding ways,
will continue to leave the state. The percentage of 10 to 24-year-old
males, the group most prone to trouble, will increase to thirteen per-
cent by the year 2000. The population will also be more diverse and
less homogenous. By the year 2020, the percentage of Hispanics will
49. THE CALIFORNIA STATE LEGISLATIVE JOINT COMMITTEE ON PRISON CON-
STRUCTION AND OPERATIONS, THE CRIMINAL ALIEN (1993).
50. Id.
51. News reports speculated that the Administration's move was in reaction to a
potentially more expensive amendment to the pending crime bill to make such reimburse-
ment automatic beginning in 1998. James Bornemeier, U.S. Aid Urged for State Prison
Costs, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1994, at A25.
rise from 26% of the state's population to 41 %, while whites will
fall to the same 41% from 57%; blacks will dip from 7% to 6%,
and Asians will rise from 10% to 12%. According to the article, the
criminal system will be increasingly filled with people unacquainted
with American customs and legal standards, immigrants from coun-
tries where people are reluctant to report crimes or otherwise cooper-
ate with police. 2
Federal help in offsetting any of these costs has been minimal. In
the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), Con-
gress established the State Legalization Impact Assistance Grant
(SLIAG) program to partially reimburse states for costs of providing
public health, public assistance, and educational services to aliens
granted lawful permanent residence. A total of $3.5 billion (after
"offsets" for certain federal costs) was to be provided to the states by
IRCA during the five years such aliens were ineligible for many fed-
eral benefits. In establishing SLIAG, the federal government tacitly
acknowledged that the amnesty population would have a major im-
pact on state and local costs.
Of the 3 million amnesty applicants granted lawful residency
under IRCA, 1.6 million reside in California. California has in-
curred more than $1.9 billion in SLIAG-defined costs for these am-
nesty immigrants to date, and projects such costs through fiscal year
1994 at $2.18 billion. As of October 1992, however, California had
received only $1.63 billion in SLIAG funds, a shortfall of hundreds
of millions of dollars which was expected to grow.
Congressional action on SLIAG put the viability even of this
promised partial funding in doubt. The federal fiscal year 1990 and
fiscal year 1991 Labor-HHS-Education Appropriations Acts de-
ferred $1.12 billion of SLIAG funding to fiscal year 1992. However,
actual proposed appropriations in 1992 were zero until strong pro-
tests from California resulted in an appropriation of $325 million in
October 1992, thus effectively stripping $812 million from the previ-
ously approved $1.1 billion that had been set aside for health and
education programs for legalization immigrants. The Clinton Ad-
ministration budget submitted in early 1994 for fiscal year 1994-
1995 contained zero dollars for such reimbursement.
F. Refugee Costs
The federal policy of shifting immigration program costs to state
and local government also applies to refugees. The Federal Refugee
Act of 1980 requires that refugees be immediately eligible for
AFDC, SSI/SSP, and Medicaid when they enter the country. At the
52. Philip Hager, California Courts, The Future of Crime, CAL LAW, Nov. 1993,
at 31, 32.
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time the Act was passed, the federal government realized that the
required match for these programs would have a significant financial
impact on state and local general funds. Therefore, the Act provided
that the federal government would reimburse the states for the non-
federal share of these programs during the first thirty-six months
refugees were in the country. Also, to protect state and local general
assistance programs, the Act provided for full federal funding of a
special Refugee Cash and Medical Assistance Program (RCA/
RMA) for those needy refugees who did not qualify for the categori-
cal programs during their first thirty-six months in the country.
This reimbursement commitment was conditioned on the appropri-
ation of adequate funding. However, there has been a steady series
of cutbacks from this commitment, to the point that in January
1993, RCA/RMA was terminated and replaced with a privately run
program which may not be adequate to prevent further cost trans-
fers.53 In the meantime, between 1986 and 1992, when most of these
cost transfers took place, annual refugee admission levels nearly'
doubled, from 62,000 to 120,000. The impact to the state of Califor-
nia has been to transfer costs of nearly $200 million each year to
state and local taxpayers for the costs of AFDC, SSI/SSP, and
Medicaid services provided to refugees each year.
G. Total Costs
What do all these numbers add up to? The California Department
of Finance estimated the cost of immigration-related services to the
state at approximately $4.787 billion in 1992-1993, including $474
million in Medi-Cal, $444 million in AFDC and SSI/SSP, $243 mil-
lion in Corrections, and $3.626 billion in K-12 school costs. This fig-
ure was broken down to $1.687 billion for illegal aliens, $158 million
for legalization immigrants under IRCA,54 $121 million for refugees,
53. The issue of discretionary or mandatory reimbursement has been addressed in
Thongsamouth v. Schweiker, 711 F.2d 465 (1st Cir. 1983). The court held the language
of Title 8, U.S.C. § 1522(e)(1) requiring payment of special cash and medical assistance
benefits to refugees is merely permissive and confers complete discretion upon the Direc-
tor of the Office of Refugee Resettlement.
54. In at least one California county, the 1986 legalization of amnesty immigrants
by IRCA is directly blamed for an explosion in costs. The 1993 Orange County Grand
Jury, in calling for a nationwide three-year moratorium on immigration, noted the IRCA
response in Orange County was overwhelming, 192,000 amnesty applications, of which
88% came from Mexican nationals. Claimed IRCA effects from 1986 to 1991 were a
145% increase in Medi-Cal (470% for Hispanics), a 76% increase in AFDC (154% for
Hispanics), and a doubling, to 20%, of the AFDC share of citizen children. For the
period 1983-1989, immigrant families comprised 50% of the AFDC caseload, and 30%
and $2.821 billion for legal immigrants and citizen children (i.e.,
children born in the United States of illegal immigrants). These
figures do not include local government costs, nor do they include
indirect costs such as additional burden on physical infrastructure
like roads, water and sewers, increases in housing prices, additional
air pollution, or just plain crowding.
55
of county births in 1989 were to illegal immigrants. The report also found severe over-
crowding in many instances.
55. By way of comparison, the Governor of Florida, Lawton Chiles, has claimed
that illegal immigrants cost his state more than $1 billion annually. The INS estimates
that some 345,000 illegal immigrants reside in Florida, versus some 2.1 million in Cali-
fornia. A 1994 report prepared by the Governor's office and the Florida Advisory Council
on Intergovernmental Relations, entitled The Unfair Burden: Immigration's Impact on
Florida, calculated that Florida state and local governments in 1993 spent $884 million
on healthcare, education, prisons, and other public services for illegal immigrants. The
report, the first attempt to cost out those services, reportedly is being used to support a
lawsuit filed by Florida against the federal government. Chiles v. United States, No. 94-
0676 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 20, 1994). Florida's suit was dismissed.
California followed suit shortly thereafter. After announcing his plans in a speech in
Los Angeles on April 25, 1994, Governor Wilson filed the first in what he said would be
a series of lawsuits against the federal government for the cost of providing services to
illegal immigrants. Governor Pete Wilson, Speech at Los Angeles Townhall (Apr. 25,
1994), in 60 VITAL SPEECHES 534 (1994). Suit was filed April 29, 1994 in United States
District Court in San Diego, seeking $377.8 million for the costs of incarcerating nearly
17,000 illegal immigrant prisoners, an order that the INS take custody of such felons
upon the end of their sentences and deport them directly into their own countries rather
than at the border, and $1.6 billion reimbursement for the costs of building eight new
prisons. The state argues that existing federal immigration policy violates the 10th
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which reserves to the states those powers not spe-
cifically enumerated to the federal government, because it effectively requires California
to spend 10% of its tax dollars in ways it does not choose. The suit also charges that the
effective shift of immigration costs to the states violates the constitutional provision es-
tablishing a republican form of government. California v. United States, No. 94-0674
(S.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 1995). California's suit was also dismissed. At the same time, Wilson
announced he would increase from 49 to 176 the number of National Guard troops as-
signed to the border to repair and build roads and mend fences, thus freeing up the U.S
Border Patrol to apprehend illegal immigrants.
Meanwhile, at least one Los Angeles city councilman has called for a similar suit
against the state.
In 1992, New York sued the federal government for failing to take custody of both
legal and illegal immigrants in that state's prison system. Negotiations are currently un-
derway to resolve these claims.
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COST OF IMMIGRATION-RELATED SERVICES TO THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA FISCAL YEAR 1992-1993
(Dollars In Millions)
TYPE OF IMMIGRANT
Refugees Amnesty Undocumented Other Total
[a] [b] [c] [d]
AFDC
State $99 $39 0 $263 $401
Federal $111 $42 0 $287 $440
Total $210 $81 0 $550 $841
SSI/SSP
State $20 $23 0 0 $43
Federal $20 $28 0 0 $48
Total $40 $51 0 0 $91
Medi-Cal
State $2 $96 $376 [e] $474
Federal $21 $96 $377 [el $494
Total $23 $192 $753 [e] $968
K-12
Education
State f11 ff] $1,068 $2,558 $3,626
Federal If [f] [f1 [f1 [f]
Total If] [f] $1,068 $2,558 $3,626
Corrections
State [f] [f] $243 [f] $243
Federal 0 0 0 0 0
Total [f [f] $243 [f] $243
Total
State $121 $158 $1,687 $2,821 $4,787
Federal $152 $166 $377 $287 $982
Total $273 $324 $2,064 $3,108 $5,769
[a] Services provided only to time-eligible refugees.
[b] Services provided to immigrants who have obtained legal status under the Immigration
Reform and Control Act.
[c Services provided to undocumented immigrants pursuant to the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1986.
[d] Services provided to permanent resident immigrants and citizen children whose parents
are legalized or undocumented immigrants. Identifiable costs only.
[e] Unknown, but probably tens of millions of dollars.
If] Unknown
Source: Department of Finance, From Adversity to Opportunity, Governor's Budget 1993-1994
(January 1993).
According to the Wilson Administration, state and local figures
for fiscal year 1993-1994 were also substantial for both illegal immi-
grants and citizen children, totalling almost $3 billion:
STATE COSTS TOTAL (million)
(million) (inc. local)
Medi-Cal (Emergency) $367 $734
Medi-Cal (Pre-natal) $82 $82
Corrections $380 $490
K-12 $636 $1,100
Citizen Children AFDC $236 $472
Citizen Children Medi-Cal $35 $70
$1.736 billion $2.948 billion
Average daily K-12 attendance by citizen children was 255,000,
up from 158,800 in 1988-1989, with a corresponding rise in costs
from $640 million to $1.1 billion. The number of illegal immigrants
incarcerated for felonies rose from 5,581 in 1988-1989 to 16,392 in
1993-1994, with a rise in costs from $104.3 million to $350 million.
The number of monthly eligible recipients of Medi-Care under
OBRA provisions requiring treatment of illegal immigrants rose
from 23,750 ($22 million) in 1988-1989, to an estimated 368,830
($367.6 million) in 1993-1994. Monthly Medi-Cal treatments of citi-
zen children rose from 38,800 ($8 million) in 1988-1989, to an esti-
mated 176,750 ($35 million) in 1993-1994. AFDC payments to
citizen children rose from $45 million to $236 million during the
same period.
For 1994-1995, the Wilson Administration estimated illegal immi-
gration costs to the state of $2.5 billion: $1.7 billion for public edu-
cation, $402 million for prison costs, and $400 million for health
services under Medi-Cal. The Governor sought federal reimburse-
ment of $2.3 billion, allowing for the later start of the federal fiscal
year:
1994-1995 IMMIGRATION REIMBURSEMENT PROPOSAL
PROGRAM POPULATION STATE COSTS
Education 392,260 $1.7 billion
Corrections 23,363 $300 million
Medi-Cal 390,000 $300 million
TOTAL $_ 2.3 BILLION
These figures do not include any costs for citizen children or capital
costs. Addition of the former and some modest estimates for the lat-
ter brings the total annual state costs related to illegal immigration
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to $3.6 billion.
H. California's Attempt to Secure Federal Reimbursement
The Wilson Administration sought reimbursement for California
from the federal government for a substantial portion of these un-
funded federal mandates for fiscal year 1993-1994, but to little avail.
In a January 18, 1993 letter to President Clinton, released contem-
poraneously with the Governor's 1993-1994 budget, Governor Wil-
son complained about unfunded federal mandates and noted that
three-quarters of the state budget is devoted to education, health,
and welfare. The letter stressed the impact of federal requirements
that states provide benefits for immigrants and refugees, and as-
sessed the costs of such benefits at more than $4 billion. The Gover-
nor's Budget 1993-1994 states:
Given the state's extraordinary fiscal problems, California can no longer
continue to subsidize federal immigration policy. Accordingly, the Gover-
nor's Budget for 1993-1994 proposes that the federal government formally
acknowledge its financial responsibilities associated with immigration pol-
icy. The Governor has requested the federal government, beginning in the
1993-1994 fiscal year, to assume financial responsibility for a variety of
mandated health, welfare and correctional programs. Specifically, the
budget is predicated upon Congress authorizing and appropriating funds to-
talling $1.5 billion, no later than May 15 for the following purposes:
0 The balance of federal SLIAG funds owed the state, primarily for
federally mandated entitlement programs: $324 million.
* Enhanced federal funding for the cost of refugee resettlement:
$104 million.
0 100% federal funding for the cost of AFDC grants provided to
citizen children of undocumented parents: $209 million.
• 100% federal funding for the cost of Medi-Cal services provided
to citizen children of undocumented parents: $31 million.
. 100% federal funding for the cost of Medi-Cal services provided
to legalized and undocumented immigrants: $534 million.
* Full federal funding for the cost of incarcerating undocumented
immigrants in state prisons: $250 million.
These federal funds are needed in order to allow the state to continue pro-
viding high priority education, public safety, health and social services to all
of the state's residents. If the state is unable to obtain additional federal
funding as budgeted, the state will be forced to reduce services for non-
federally mandated services.
The Wilson Administration also later ran full-page ads in the New
York Times, Washington Times, and USA Today in August 1993 to
bolster its claims that California's quality of life and economic re-
covery were "under siege" from illegal immigration and to urge the
repeal of federal mandates. The Governor also suggested to the Clin-
ton Administration that California be the testing ground for a new
Population, Immigration and Growth[VOL. 31- 945. 1994]
tamper-proof federal identification card to keep illegal immigrants
from receiving public benefits or getting jobs in the United States.56
The Wilson Administration's request did not include any reim-
bursement for K-12 school costs for immigrants, which totalled
$3.626 billion in fiscal year 1992-1993. In any event, ultimately only
$324 million in SLIAG funding was provided, after a conference
committee deleted funding for emergency healthcare for illegal
immigrants.
This scenario may be repeated. The Governor's budget for fiscal
year 1994-1995 has requested some $2.5 billion in federal reimburse-
ments for immigration, including $1.7 billion to educate 392,260
school-age illegal immigrant children, $400 million to provide emer-
gency and pregnancy-related medical care to 390,000 illegal immi-
grants, and $403 million to imprison more than 18,000 illegal
immigrant felons. President Clinton's 1994-1995 budget has pro-
vided for zero funding.
L What Are The Real Costs?
The California DOF figure, despite its size, of nearly $4.8 billion
in fiscal year 1993-1994 state costs for immigrant-related services,
including education, does not give a complete picture of total costs.
It did not include any amount for additional state and local spending
for transportation, solid waste and sewer facilities, school construc-
tion, clean water and air treatment, or other infrastructure necessi-
tated by a larger population. State infrastructure spending varies
(the 1991-1992 figure was $1.8 billion; the 1992-1993 figure was
$4.8 billion); $1.5 billion is a conservative annual figure. In addition,
state financing costs for this funding (i.e., interest on G.O. bonds)
has risen steadily from $630 million in 1989-1990 to $1.501 billion
in 1992-1993; it is not expected to go down. A total annual figure of
$3 billion in capital costs and interest is therefore not unreasonable.
It may be open to debate whether all of this is incremental spending
related to population growth (e.g., open space and parks may not
56. Bill Stall, Wilson Expands on Plan for ID Card, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1993, at
A3.
Meanwhile, the issue of immigration also found its way into the gubernatorial cam-
paign in California, with State Treasurer Kathleen Brown, then widely expected to be a
Democratic candidate against Wilson, making her own proposals for a tamper-proof so-
cial security card, employer sanctions, and military troops on the border. Danelia Wild,
Brown Calls for Package of Immigration Reforms, UNITED PRESS INT'L, Sept. 29, 1993.
Governor Wilson also requested, in an August 30, 1993 letter that was made public,
that Mexican President Salinas help seal the border against illegal entries. Mexican For-
eign Relations Secretary Fernando Solana replied rather icily that to do so would violate
the Mexican Constitution: "The proposal you make that Mexico help impede the flow of
persons toward our border is unacceptable." Patrick J. McDonnell, Mexico Rebukes
Wilson Over Immigrant Plan, L.A. Tiajs, Sept. 11, 1993, at Al.
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be), but given a foreign-born population of 26.5 % in addition to citi-
zen children, it is not unreasonable to attribute a quarter of this
amount, or $750 million, to this, making the total annual state immi-
grant-related costs approximately $5.5 billion in fiscal year 1992-
1993. The figure is undoubtedly higher for subsequent years. Costs
for illegal immigrants alone will probably total $3.6 billion in 1994-
1995, and legal immigrants are estimated at twice the number of
illegal immigrants in California (approximately 200,000 versus
100,000). It is not unreasonable, therefore, to believe that the total
annual immigration-related state costs may exceed $10 billion in the
near future.
A frequent criticism of reports of illegal immigrant costs is that
they ignore taxes such persons pay. However, the conclusion is intui-
tively obvious that costs must be substantially greater since illegal
immigrants are lower-income for the most part, and the state's in-
come tax is sharply progressive (i.e., those with more money pay
more) while its delivery of services is regressive (i.e., the poor receive
more). The best estimate is that in California, illegal immigrants pay
to the state approximately one-quarter of their state costs.
In addition, it is probably not possible to quantify all costs from
immigration because many of them are borne not by state govern-
ment (at least not directly) but by the citizens of California in the
private sector. These costs include everything from greater conges-
tion on the roads to higher insurance costs on account of the high
proportion of uninsured illegal immigrant drivers. To this must be
added the costs of greater congestion, wear and tear on infrastruc-
ture, housing prices, and environmental impacts such as air quality.
Professor Donald Huddle of Rice University in Texas has pur-
ported to comprehensively analyze the public sector costs of legal
and illegal immigrants.5" He calculates current costs for 19.3 million
legal, illegal, and amnesty immigrants accepted into the U.S. since
1970 at net $42.5 billion ($25.6 billion for the 11.97 million legal
immigrants, $11.9 billion for 4.8 million illegal immigrants, and $5
billion for 2.52 million amnesty immigrants), or $1,629 per capita
revenue deficit for legal immigrants, versus a $120 per capita reve-
nue surplus for U.S.-born residents. 58
57. DONALD HUDDLE, CARRYING CAPACITY NETWORK, THE COSTS OF IMMIGRA-
TION (update July 20, 1993).
58. Huddle estimates that the 7.4 million legal and illegal immigrants in Califor-
nia from 1970 to 1992 have cost taxpayers $18 billion more than they paid in taxes. Two
million of these have been illegal immigrants and have cost a net $5 billion. Richard
Simon, 1992 Cost of Immigrants $18 Billion, Report Says, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1993, at
Looking at prospective costs over the next decade, from 1993 to
2002, Huddle assumes continued immigration, legal and illegal, of
1.11 million per year. The net public cost of post-1970 immigration
would then be $668.5 billion in 1993 dollars, or some $67 billion a
year, with legal immigrants responsible for three-quarters of those
costs. On average, Huddle asserts, U.S. taxpayers would save $22
billion each year if immigration were halted. Illegal immigrants
alone will cost $221.5 billion in public assistance and employment
displacement costs, but will provide only one-sixth that amount -
$35.1 billion - in taxes. Universal healthcare coverage will only add
to the bill, since the poverty rate of immigrants is 42.8 % higher than
that of native-born Americans. Huddle asserts that permitting
skilled and professional immigrants only (thirty-eight percent of the
total) would save $358.2 billion over the ten-year period and result
in a revenue surplus of $13.7 billion.
Huddle also challenges the notion that immigrants bolster the So-
cial Security system by providing a continuing pool of younger work-
ers. According to his calculations, in 1992 the foreign-born took out
a net $2.7 billion from the system; the native-born population con-
tributed a net surplus of $14.0 billion. Huddle calculates that from
1993 to 2002, the foreign-born net social security deficit will rise one
percent annually, to $2.98 billion. Thus, the addition of large num-
bers of foreign workers to help ensure social security solvency will
have the opposite effect.
This weak contribution reflects the significantly greater proportion
of low-wage earners in the foreign-born population; although they
constitute 8.4% of the population, they make only 5.1 % of Social
Security contributions. In addition, the progressivity of the Social
Security system creates imbalances in favor of low-wage immigrants:
low-wage earners (defined as those making 45 % or less of the na-
tional average wage) receive 58.3 % of their wages in benefit levels
($5.41 in retirement benefits for each dollar of contributions), aver-
age wage earnings (100% of the average) receive 42.7% ($3.96 in
benefits for each dollar of contributions) and high wage earners (at
or above the maximum salary subject to Social Security contribu-
tions) get 24% ($2.22 for each dollar). Huddle concludes that ad-
ding large numbers of low wage earners would drain the system:
"The additional payroll taxes would be modest and, in the case of
families with children earning less than $18,000, would be largely
offset by refundable earned income tax credits and higher revenue
losses from displacement."59
A3.
59. DONALD HUDDLE & DAVID SIMCOX, CARRYING CAPACITY NETWORK, THE
IMPACT OF IMMIGRATION ON THE SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM (July 20, 1993).
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These studies are not unchallenged. An Urban Institute study by
Jeffrey S. Passel, released in Los Angeles February 22, 1994, again
took issue with Huddle's calculation and found instead that immi-
grants in California contribute $12 billion more in taxes each year
than they consume in services, versus Huddle's calculation of net
state costs of more than $18 billion.60 On a national level, Passel
found a net contribution by immigrants of $28.7 billion, whereas
Huddle claims a net cost of $42.5 billion. The study was financed by
the Tomas Rivera Center, a Claremont-based Latino policy study
institute. Passel attacked Huddle's estimates of immigrant popula-
tions, school enrollments, and tax payments.6' In addition, a cur-
rently circulating draft report by Passel and Michael Fix of the
Urban Institute, entitled Immigration and Immigrants: Setting the
Record Straight, claims: "Overall, annual taxes paid by immigrants
to all levels of government more than offset the cost of services re-
ceived, generating a net annual surplus of $25 billion to $30 billion
per year."'62 (The draft notes, however, that most of this goes to the
federal government.)
A recent State Senate Office of Research report, commissioned by
State Senator Art Torres, has attempted to rebut the notion that
immigrants impose special cost burdens.63 Its basic point is that post-
1980 immigrants to California use welfare only slightly more than
do long-term residents, as a percentage of their respective popula-
tions, 4.8 % versus 4.1 %, respectively (actually, this is 20 % higher).
The report borders on the disingenuous, however, in deliberately ig-
noring the issue of net costs: the fact is that recent immigrants fail
to generate the tax dollars that long-term residents provide.64
60. Patrick J. McDonnell, Immigrant Study Cites Fiscal Gain, L.A. TIMES, Feb.
23, 1994, at B4.
61. Id. The Clinton Administration has hired the Urban Institute to determine the
cost of services delivered to illegal immigrants and the amount of tax revenues they gen-
erate. In addition, Senator Barbara Boxer has asked the General Accounting office to
look at the numbers. Both have questioned the fiscal estimates used by the Wilson
Administration.
62. Jeffrey S. Passel & Michael Fix, Urban Institute, Immigration and Immi-
grants: Setting the Record Straight (unpublished draft 1994).
63. CALIFORNIA STATE SENATE OFFICE OF RESEARCH, CALIFORNIANS TOGETHER:
DEFINING THE STATE'S ROLE IN IMMIGRATION (1993).
64. The report also asserted that all Americans carry per capita net government
costs, but did not address the fact that residents already live here, whereas immigration
policy is discretionary. The report's recommendations include a special office for immi-
grants with a director as "a state spokesperson for newcomers on immigrant issues,"
strengthening bilingualism, ensuring non-English speakers have access to government ser-
vices, coordinating responses to "anti-immigrant media attacks," assisting the foreign-
born in acquiring citizenship, an anti-discrimination campaign, and establishing a hot
Part of California's problem is of its own making, since the state
has enacted extremely generous benefits which have now been locked
in by federal regulation. According to the Wall Street Journal, for
example, the reason illegal immigration is a major issue in Califor-
nia but not in Texas, is that California spends more on welfare and
social services - more than $3 billion, versus $456 million in
Texas. 5 According to another publication:
Illegal aliens are no fools. They know that the social services they will get in
California are far better than those in Texas, and plan their routes accord-
ing. A recent study for the California legislature showed that $5.1 billion of
the $50 billion state budget goes into services for both documented and un-
documented immigrants, including about $3.5 billion for education.06
Essentially, as one commentator has noted, we have moved from wel-
coming immigration to subsidizing it.
6 7
Critics of immigration cost studies point out that immigrants pay
taxes and provide benefit through hard work for low wages. Both of
these points are undoubtedly true. However, most of the taxes paid
go to the federal government, whereas most of the services are paid
for at the state and local level. Second, most of the benefit goes to
the private sector, whereas most of the costs are borne by the public.
It is these twin imbalances which must be addressed if immigration
is not to be a continuing concern for California.
New immigrants generally have an excellent work ethic, conserva-
tive family values, and do not exceed the welfare rates of long-term
residents. But precisely because they are unskilled, they generate rel-
atively little in tax revenue, while consuming an inordinate share of
public resources, particularly in the schools because of their large
families. The conventional wisdom, that overall immigration pays its
way, is simply wrong, particularly when it is a continuing
phenomenon.
In effect, California is paying the bill for the nation's immigration
policies. As a practical matter, the state has been obliged to shoulder
the disproportionally largest part of the considerable fiscal, social,
and environmental impacts of large-scale national immigration. Cali-
fornia is forming the human capital for much of the nation's future
growth. The whole country is benefitted, but the whole country does
line to report exploitation of immigrants. Id.
65. Review & Outlook: The New Neighborhood, WALL ST. J., Oct. 12, 1993, at
A20.
66. Immigration; A Giant Sucking Sound, ECONOMIST, June 5-11, 1993, at 28, 29.
This discrepancy has not prevented efforts to enforce border restrictions in Texas, how-
ever. The Border Patrol mounted an effective blockade in the fall of 1993 at El Paso,
resulting in an estimated almost 80% reduction in illegal crossings. Esther Schrader,
State Eager to Copy Border Blockade, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Oct. 25, 1993, at
Al.
67. Arnold Steinberg, Government Policies at Root of Immigration Crisis, LA.
TIMES, Sept. 12, 1993, at B15.
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not pay. If California does a poor job of forming this human capital,
in a generation the state will have a large population of poorly edu-
cated, unproductive citizens who will be free to settle as they will
throughout the country, but who will be unable to make a corre-
sponding contribution. By contrast, if California does a good job, it
will enrich both itself and the nation.
The key to whether California does a good or bad job depends on
its investment in this human potential. Investment will cost money.
And money is in short supply. Not merely because it is right, but
because it is productively self-serving, the nation must help Califor-
nia in this task. Under present circumstances, the cost-benefit ratio
of immigration is unfairly skewed: benefits in terms of personal
taxes, and business taxes based on cheap labor, flow mostly to the
federal government; while costs are borne by state and especially lo-
cal governments.
What significance does this have for California's future growth?
First, these costs obviously are billions of dollars that we do not have
available to build infrastructure, protect open space, or otherwise
pay for better land use and development patterns. Second, the immi-
gration itself is the principal driver in the population growth and
impacts that spur the need to deal with growth in the first place.
VIII. PUBLIC AND LEGISLATIVE REACTION
A. Public Reaction
Public concern and controversy over immigration have been
mounting. A Roper poll in 1992 found that 63% of Californians
thought there were too many immigrants, the highest percentage in
the nation. The national figure was 54%. Sixty-nine percent of Cali-
fornia respondents said California's population was too large (28 %
nationally), and 78 % said immigrants were a financial burden on
the state (43 % nationally),.8
In 1993, the Charlton Research Company in San Francisco found
that 93 % of Californians said immigration was a "serious problem,"
79 % said "very serious," and 89 % thought it a major burden on the
California economy. Eighty-one percent thought the state should not
pay for immigrant education, and 79 % said "no" to paying for im-
migrant health care.6 9 A July 14, 1993 USA Today/Gallup Poll
68. Immigration-and Backlash, supra note 8, at Al.
69. John Jacobs, Immigration Politics, SACRAMENTO BEE, Aug. 15, 1993, at F04.
showed 49 % of Americans said "immigration should be reduced un-
til the economy improves," and 64% said immigrants "mostly hurt"
the economy.
A Field Institute poll in August 1993 found 76% of California
respondents agreeing that illegal immigration was "very serious" in
California (up from 66% in 1987) and 17% "somewhat serious."
Sixty-six percent supported deploying the National Guard on the
border, 50% supported amending the U.S. Constitution to deny au-
tomatic citizenship to children of illegal immigrants, and 70% sup-
ported a cross-border toll. However, 70% of respondents said that
immigrants made as good or better citizens and 52% said they did
not take jobs from existing residents. Fifty-eight percent said illegal
immigrants should receive emergency benefits, but not welfare
(77 %) and not attend public school (51 %). Latinos sometimes re-
sponded just as strongly as Anglos. Two-thirds of respondents said
immigrants should be able to preserve their own languages.
According to a Los Angeles Times poll in September of 1993,
86% of Californians described illegal immigration as a major or
moderate problem. Nearly three-quarters - 73 % - favored using
the National Guard to patrol the U.S. southern border. Fifty-four
percent favored a constitutional amendment to preclude children of
illegal immigrants from automatically becoming U.S. citizens if born
on American soil. However, by a 54% to 39 % margin, they opposed
preventing illegal immigrant children from attending school, and by
74% to 23 % they opposed denying illegal immigrants emergency
medical care. 70
National sentiment against liberal immigration policies also ap-
pears to be on the rise. According to an earlier poll in the summer of
1993, in addition to national polls noted elsewhere in this paper,
65 % of Americans believed all immigration should be reduced and
55 % said diversity mostly threatens American culture.71 A recent
New York Times/CBS News poll reported 61 % of those surveyed
favored a decrease in immigration, up from 49% in 1986, 42% in
1977, and 33% in 1965.72 A 1992 Wall Street Journal/NBC poll
showed 71% of those surveyed believed immigration should be cut
back while 24% thought it should be allowed to remain at current
levels.7 3 Sixty percent of Americans thought immigration is "bad for
the country," although it was a good thing in the past. 4 Perhaps
70. Dianne Klein, Majority in State Are Fed Up with Illegal Immigration, L.A.
TiMES, Sept. 19, 1993, at Al.
71. Public Wants Fewer Immigrants, S.F. CHRON., July 23, 1993, at A26.
72. Seth Mydans, Poll Finds Tide of Immigration Brings Hostility, N.Y TIMES,
June 27, 1993, § 1, at 1.
73. Rich Jaroslovsky, Washington Wire, WALL ST. J., Dec. 18, 1992, at Al.
74. Morganthau, supra note 29, at 18.
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more surprisingly, recent immigrants themselves may hold this view
even more strongly. According to a Latino National Policy Survey,
73 % of Cuban non-citizen U.S. residents, 74% of non-Hispanic
white U.S. citizens, and 84% 'of Mexican non-citizen U.S. residents
believe there are too many immigrants in the United States. 75 A
CNN/USA Today/Gallup poll in the summer of 1993 found that
65 % of respondents thought immigration should be reduced.76
The view is beginning to re-assert itself against the "politically
correct" position that multiculturalism is an unalloyed good. Accord-
ing to one recent commentary:
We should not let multiculturalism disunite America. The United States
has been the most successful country in history in assimilating and integrat-
ing huge numbers of different ethnic and racial groups. We achieved this by
turning foreigners into Americans who were educated in English, did busi-
ness in English, and accepted the American Constitution, the American
creed, and its values - not by bilingualism or multiculturalism.
7
Absent assimilation, the fear is that we will become little more than
a collection of angry tribes who have in common only that they in-
habit the same piece of real estate, a description that could well fit
Bosnia.
In addition, the dimensions of the immigration flow itself retard
assimilation. One commentator has said: "While it is true that many
immigrants eventually assimilate, continued massive immigration
retards that process."' 78 And an L.A. Times reporter has added:
In this century, the long hiatus in large-scale immigration (from about 1925
until 1970) provided a crucial window of opportunity for the children of the
great turn-of-the century wave to be educated, assimilated and integrated.
The long pause enabled the United States to invest in our own workers and
improve American productivity.
79
Columnist George Will (in Slamming Shut the Golden Door to
Immigrants, an article in the July 30, 1993 issue of Times-Pica-
yune) has noted two key differences in the setting for immigration in
the past and today: the current welfare culture and the weakening of
assimilation:
America is not just an economy .... [i]t is a culture. The high rate of
75. The World This Week: Politics and Current Affairs, ECONOMIST, Dec. 19-25,
1992, at 6.
76. Major Garrett, Economic Plan Includes Aliens' Medical Funds, WASH. TIMES,
July 14, 1993, at Al.
77. PETER DUIGNAN. THE UNITED STATES: A HOPEFUL FUTURE (Hoover Institu-
tion, 1993).
78. BOUVIER, DEMOGRAPHY OF AMERICA'S FUTURE, supra note 14, at 13.
79. Dan Stein, Here's an Idea: Hold Off on Immigration, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 29,
1993, at B7.
immigration since 1960, combined with the high fertility rate of immigrants
relative to that of native-born Americans, is producing rapid change in the
nation's ethnic and cultural balance. Peter Brimelow, a contributing editor
of National Review and senior editor of Forbes, says, "The onus should not
be on the critics of current policy to explain their motives. Instead, support-
ers of current policy must explain why they wish to transform the American
nation as it had evolved by 1965."
There is increasing evidence as well that at least some of today's
immigrants may not want to assimilate, something clearly rooted in
common sense both in the greater diversity of current immigration
and in the liberal political culture tolerating and even promoting cul-
tural separateness."0 A recent Latino mayoral appointee to a Los
Angeles city commission, Xavier Hermosillo, was rejected in part by
the City Council because of his undiplomatic remarks to the same
end, for example that Latinos were taking over Los Angeles "block
by block" and that Anglos should "wake up and smell the refried
beans." According to the U.S. Bureau of the Census, English was a
foreign language to 23 million U.S. residents in 1980 and to 32 mil-
lion in 1990.
The immigration issue has also polarized debate" and inspired a
backlash from some liberal and Democratic quarters. Los Angeles
Roman Catholic Cardinal Mahony, for example, has criticized polit-
ical proposals to curb immigration, claiming that the right of people
to immigrate in order to flee political persecution, or to seek eco-
nomic opportunity, is more fundamental than the right of a couhtry
to control its own borders.82 An October 16, 1993 march in San Di-
ego featured pro-immigrant demonstrators holding a banner with an
Aztec face, reading "Who's the Illegal Alien, Pilgrim?
8S3
Assembly Democrats in the California Legislature have tried to
change the focus by concentrating on employer sanctions. One bill
introduced in the 1993 Legislative Session would have allowed for-
feiture of assets used by firms hiring illegal immigrants. 4 However,
80. See, e.g., Sam Fulwood III, Children of New Arrivals Avoid Melting into the
Mainstream, L.A. TIMEs, Sept. 7, 1993, at A5 (discussing a recent study by Johns Hop-
kins sociology professor Alejandro Partes and Michigan State sociology professor Ruben
Rumbaut); David E. Hayes-Bautista et al., A Wake-up Call at Death's Door: Chicano
Studies Are Our Future, L.A. TIMES, June 2, 1993, at B7 (asserting a Latino takeover of
a dying Anglo culture in Los Angeles and noting "the slow social disintegration of a
departing society").
81. Daniel M. Weintraub, Legal Immigration to State Up By 23%, Report Finds,
L.A. TIMEs, Sept. 4, 1993, at A24; Ronald Brownstein, Polarization Marks Debate on
Immigration Policy, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1993, at Al.
82. Larry B. Stammer, Mahony Blasts Political Stance on Immigrants, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 9, 1993, at Bl.
83. Juan Forero, Anti-immigrant Trend Protested 400 Marchers Send Message:
"Enough - Stop the Bashing," SAN DIEGO UNIoN-TRm., Oct. 17, 1993, at B2.
84. Robert B. Gunnison, Democrats' Sanctions for Hiring Illegals, S.F. CHRON.,
Aug. 31, 1993, at B4; Eric Bailey, Bill Would Allow Seizure of Firms Hiring Illegals,
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 31, 1993, at A16.
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it is generally conceded that, to date, sanctions, at least those in the
1986 IRCA law, have been a failure. False papers are easily ar-
ranged. The INS has only 350 people to police the entire nation.
Since IRCA, approximately 47,000 illegal aliens have been arrested
at work, out of an estimated total of 10 to 12 million, at most a ratio
of one-half of one percent.85
Newspaper editorials have also been weighing in with judgments.
The San Diego Union-Tribune has proposed a national identification
system (August 29, 1993). The L. A. Times supports a tamper-proof
I.D. card, enforcement of existing laws against employment of illegal
aliens, a cross-border toll, better control of borders, more federal aid,
economic development in sending nations, and "more carefully
drawn rules" on legal immigrants and refugees. 6 The L. A. Times
earlier suggested a "sophisticated guest-worker program," with tem-
porary visas for immigrants to serve as nannies or home-care provid-
ers, as is done in Canada, for up to three years.87
A number of newspapers have decried the focus on immigrants.
The New York Times suggested it was "nativist demagogy" to
blame immigrants for California's woes.8 The Los Angeles Times
criticized Governor Wilson as "restrictionist," in particular because
of his proposal to deny citizenship to children of illegal aliens, and
praised President Clinton for taking the "middle ground." 8
In California, citizens have taken matters into their own hands
and circulated a popular initiative for placement on the November
1994 ballot, Proposition 187. Dubbed "Save Our State," it was pro-
moted by former INS Western Regional Director Howard Ezell and
former INS Commissioner Alan Nelson, and it would bar illegal
aliens from most state services. Former Los Angeles County Supervi-
sor Pete Schabarum had also earlier considered a second such
initiative.
85. Immigration; A Giant Sucking Sound, supra note 66, at 28.
86. The Smart Way to Get a Handle on the Immigration Issue, L.A. TIMES, July
25, 1993, at M4; Immigration Control: Doing It Right, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1993, at
M4; How Best to Reduce Illegal Immigration, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1993, at B6.
87. Illegal Immigration: One Issue that Deserves Light, Not Heat, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 7, 1993, at M4.
88. California Scapegoats, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1993, at A16.
89. Let's Not Panic, Says the President, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1993, at B6; An-
other False Solution for Immigration, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1993, at B7.
B. Legislative Reaction
The increasing, and increasingly obvious, burden of immigration
on California in particular caused the issue of illegal immigration to
burst onto the political scene in 1993. Although earlier calls to en-
force or reform immigration laws had been made (for example, by
Congressman Elton Gallegly, R-Simi Valley), major policy proposals
by California Governor Pete Wilson and Senator Dianne Feinstein
apparently legitimized debate on the issue. Governor Wilson has
noted, for example, "it is terribly unfair and wrong to be spending
state tax dollars for illegal immigrants and declining it to working
poor who are legal residents."'90
This has unleashed a flood of proposals to stem illegal immigra-
tion, including proposals to limit illegal immigration or to reduce
costs of providing services to illegal immigrants. Proposals have been
suggested by the major political players - Wilson, Feinstein, Sena-
tor Boxer, and President Clinton. These include a cross-border toll
(Feinstein), use of the National Guard on the border (Boxer), sharp
numerical reductions in legal immigrants and asylees (Congressman
Duncan Hunter of San Diego), and tamper-proof identification and
revision of automatic citizenship for children of illegal immigrants
(Wilson).
Many other proposals were made in the California State Legisla-
ture. Of these, however, only four were enacted by both chambers
and signed by the Governor into law in the 1993 legislative session:
" SB 691 (Kopp) to ban so-called local "sanctuary" laws, which prevented
local law enforcement officials from identifying and reporting to the INS
illegal immigrants who are arrested and booked for crimes.
" SB 733 (Russell) requiring state and local government and private enti-
ties to verify a person's legal right to work before providing job place-
ment or training.
" SB 976 (Alquist) requiring first-time applicants to the Department of
Motor Vehicles for a driver's license or personal identification card to
produce evidence of citizenship or legal residence.
" SB 1131 to increase the penalties for making false statements to obtain
Medi-Cal benefits and to penalize those who assist others in doing so.
At the federal level, President Clinton declared in July of 1993,
"Our borders leak like a sieve. . . .These things cannot be permit-
ted to continue." And the Administration's Secretary of Housing
and Urban Development, Henry Cisneros, declared flatly, "There
are some benefits that undocumented immigrants clearly ought not
have . . . health benefits and welfare benefits and others that serve
as a magnet attracting people here from other countries." Clinton's
90. Daniel B. Wood, Confronting California's Immigration Issue, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Oct. 4, 1993, People, at 12.
Virtually all elected officials have continued to avoid addressing the impact of legal
immigration, which is probably two or three times that of illegal immigration.
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Attorney General, Janet Reno, stated in a July 6, 1993 speech
before the B'nai B'rith annual convention in Washington, D.C., that
growing immigration problems in the United States "will probably
be the single most critical issue" she will face in office.91
Clinton Administration proposals made July 27, 1993 were devel-
oped by a task force chaired by Vice President Albert Gore and first
outlined by President Clinton on June 18 of that year when he an-
nounced the nomination of Doris Meissner as the new INS Commis-
sioner. Principally, the proposals covered asylum reform and beefing
up the Border Patrol and were shaped in part by pending proposals
from Senator Simpson (R-Wyoming). (The President's earlier
budget on April 8, 1993 had called for a decrease in the Border
Patrol.) The proposals included increased penalties for smuggling of
illegal immigrants, additional staff to deport illegal immigrants in
jail and a speed-up in asylum hearings. Nevertheless, according to
critics, the proposals fell short in the asylum area, providing only for
"expedited" instead of summary exclusion of asylum applicants, with
a higher standard of proof. Other areas were not addressed, includ-
ing employer sanctions, the 1990 increases in legal immigration, a
national identification system, the issue of citizen children, or the
issue of whether benefits provide a "magnet" to immigrants. 92
91. During the Association of Trial Lawyers of America convention in San Fran-
cisco on August 1, 1993, Attorney General Janet Reno told reporters: "One of the great-
est challenges of the Department of Justice in the '90s is balancing this nation's tradition
as a nation of immigrants with the serious burden [that immigration has put] on our
communities." Benjamin Pimental, Reno Seeks Immigration Solution, S.F. CHRON.,
Aug. 2, 1993, at A17.
92. A July 27, 1993 "Background Briefing by Senior Administration Official" dis-
tributed in connection with the Administration's proposals stated they were an attempt
"to pull together a number of initiatives and find out how to fund them in response to the
World Trade Center bombing in New York and the alien smuggling problem that has
existed along our borders over the last several months." The briefing suggested that the
proposals break down in two parts: (1) new legislation for expedited exclusion proceed-
ings, and additional penalties for alien smuggling, and (2) an increase in the Border
Patrol and computer networking between the Border Patrol, the State Department, and
the INS.
The issue of asylum and the Administration's proposed reforms in asylum and deporta-
tion regulations also came up in the briefing. For example, Sheik Obeid, the Muslim
cleric accused of being behind the World Trade Center bombing, was admitted to the
United States and given a visa without ever checking his immigration status. Even with a
check, current procedures involve a manual microfiche system with a two-month lag. In
the meantime, most asylum applicants are simply released and even given work permits.
Asked one incredulous reporter at the background briefing, "You mean they're not kept
in jail at all? They're just out on the town - all of them? And they've already got work
permits?" The answer: "Our basic problem is that we're not able to detain everyone who
has an immigration claim, because our resources are limited. . . . Normally, we do
grant work authorization."
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The Clinton Administration apparently rejected a Congressional
proposal that apparently was in the initial planned text of Vice Pres-
ident Gore's proposals on "reinventing government," namely the
merger of the INS Border Patrol with the U.S. Customs Agency in a
new border management agency, leaving the rest of the INS to focus
on assisting immigrants already here.93 The House report asserted
that federal immigration policy suffers from inadequate leadership,
insufficient funding, failure to recognize the extent and impact of
job-seekers flooding in, and "debilitating inefficiencies" in the INS.
Finally, President Clinton rejected a number of the proposals
made by California's Governor Wilson, including amending the U.S.
Constitution to stop automatic citizenship for children born in the
United States of illegal aliens.94 The President did state that a tam-
per-proof identification card "ought to be examined."95
Other Clinton Administration proposals also bear on immigration
costs. The Administration's healthcare proposals, for example,
largely exclude illegal populations, leaving states like California in a
difficult situation because of federal laws mandating care remain un-
touched. The proposed $1 billion set-aside for illegal immigrants'
care has been denounced as "absurdly low" - California's annual
bill alone is $750 to $900 million, depending on whose estimates are
On March 29, 1994, the Administration proposed changes in refugee and asylum pro-
cedures to reduce fraud and speed up processing. The proposals would impose a filing
fee, extend the waiting period for temporary work permits, and double the number of
immigration judges and asylum officers assigned to the cases. Over 150,000 asylum ap-
plications were filed with the United States in 1993, up from 56,000 in 1991. The back-
log of cases is up to 370,000. According to the INS, many asylum applications contain
virtually identical information and are purchased by applicants in order to obtain a work
permit while their cases sit.
According to the INS, the top 25 nationalities of asylum applicants were as follows:
RANK COUNTRY APPLICANTS RANK COUNTRY APPLICANTS
I Guatemala 34,361 14 Honduras 2,836
2 El Salvador 15,362 15 Yugoslavia 2,425
3 China 14,354 16 Nigeria 1,993
4 Haiti 11,377 17 Romania 1,591
5 Mexico 6,192 18 Ghana 1,572
6 India 5,902 19 Ethiopa 1,383
7 Pakistan 4,653 20 Colombia 1,315
8 Nicaragua 4,286 21 Liberia 1,192
9 Philippines 4,107 22 Poland 1,059
10 Bangladesh 3,759 23 Ukraine 1,027
11 Russia 3,427 24 Armenia 938
12 Peru 3,244 25 Syria 872
13 Cuba 3,010
93. Ronald J. Ostrow, House Report Calls for Quick Fix of INS, L A. TIMES,
Aug. 25, 1993, at A3 (discussing the House Committee on Government Operation's re-
port The INS: Overwhelmed and Unprepared for the Future published August 25,
1993); Asking an Agency To Do Too Much, L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 26, 1993, at B6 (same).
94. David Lauter & John Broder, Clinton Differs with Wilson Ideas on Immigra-
tion, L.A. TiMEs, Aug. 13, 1993, at Al.
95. Id.
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used - and the proposals address neither how (or if) to provide such
care, or who should pay. 6 California's Congressional delegation has
criticized the proposal for failing to allocate enough money to state
and local governments for providing emergency medical care to ille-
gal immigrants.97
In the end, the Senate approved a bill on October 21, 1993 provid-
ing $45 million for 600 additional Border Patrol agents and $171
million for federal immigration services, including $40 million to
build four new immigration detention facilities. Administrative steps
were also taken. Additionally, a San Diego sector border fence be-
gun in December 1990 was extended to the beach and low tide area.
The force has pushed illegal immigrants into the Tucson Sector and
marginally reduced apprehensions in 1992 from 565,000 to 531,000,
a drop of six percent.
Additional proposals have come in 1994, some of them directed to
legal immigration. One influential Senator in the immigration de-
bate, Alan Simpson (R-Wyoming), introduced legislation (S. 1884)
on March 2, 1994 to lower temporarily the number of legal immi-
grants and to increase penalties for those who smuggle illegal immi-
grants. Simpson's bill would cut legal immigration limits from
675,000 to 500,000 annually for five years, as well as cap the num-
ber of annual asylum refugees at 80,000 unless Congress raised that
number for a "crisis or an emergency."" s Simpson asserted that a
"breather" was needed in legal immigration to allow the government
to focus on illegal immigrants. 99
Other major immigration reform proposals introduced recently in
the Congress include the following:
-HR 3862 (Stump, R-Ariz), the so-called Immigration Moratorium Act of
1994, would restrict family entries to spouses and minor children of U.S.
citizens and sharply reduce political refugee and asylum entries. It would
also reform asylum procedures, increase the Border Patrol, prohibit federal
benefits for aliens who are not lawful permanent residents, and move to bar
automatic citizenship by place of birth.
-HR 3362 (Mazzoli, D-Ky) would strengthen employer sanctions against
96. Sam H. Verhovek, Health Proposal Could Leave Aliens in U.S. Without Care,
N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 25, 1993, at Al.
97. Vlae Kershner, Lawmakers Press Clinton on Costs of Illegals' Health Care,
S.F. CHRON., Oct. 23, 1993, at A4.
98. Michael Ross, Simpson Seeks 5-Year Cut in Legal Immigration, L.A. TIMEs,
Mar. 3, 1994, at A15.
99. Id. Other calls have been made to lower the ceiling even further, to 200,000 a
year. See, e.g., Yeh Ling-Ling, The Welcome Mat is Threadbare, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 13,
1994, at B7.
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hiring illegal immigrants. HR 3363 by the same author would reform asy-
lum law and improve immigration enforcement and anti-smuggling activi-
ties. S.1348/S.1358 (Bryan, D-Nev.Johnston, D-La.) are the companion
bills in the Senate.
-HR 3320 (Bilbray, D-Nev.) would reduce legal immigration to 350,000
annually and refugees to 50,000 annually, eliminate extended family prefer-
ence categories, beef up the Border Patrol, create a tamper-proof social se-
curity card, and reform asylum and deportation procedures. SB 1923 (Reid,
D-Nev.) is the companion legislation in the Senate.
On April 21, 1994, the House of Representatives authorized the
hiring of 6,000 new Border Patrol agents and added a provision of
federal reimbursement to state and local governments that incarcer-
ate illegal immigrant felons. No money was appropriated, however.
Under the legislation, after October 1998 such reimbursement would
be automatic. As of May 1994, the legislation had yet to pass the
Senate and to be signed into law. 00
IX. WORKFORCE NEEDS
High birth rates and immigration are double-edged swords. While
in the short and medium-term they may impose high service costs to
society in the form of social programs and school populations, in the
long term they may benefit the economy by increasing the skilled
labor pool, assuming adequate educational levels and assimilation.' 0'
As one angry commentator asserted a few years ago in response to
criticism of immigrants:
Undocumented workers fill jobs that local workers will not accept; they
stimulate the local economy by expanding the overall level of employment
and lower the cost of locally produced goods and services.
We must put an end to this nonsense about the negative effects of immi-
gration and embark upon a more constructive route that considers how we
should meet the needs and improve this labor force that our economy
demands.
1 0 2
100. The Administration also recently proposed partial reimbursement to states for
costs of incarcerating illegal immigrants.
A group of 90 moderate and conservative House Democrats has also recently joined
with Republicans in proposing elimination of welfare benefits for non-citizens in order to
pay for welfare reform. William Claiborne, Immigrants' Benefits at Risk, WASH. POST,
Mar. 24, 1994, at Al. Large numbers of elderly legal immigrants sponsored by their
children are now drawing Medi-Care and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits.
Non-citizens make up about 11% of the rapidly growing SSI program, 601,430 in 1992,
up from 127,900 in 1982. Id. at A18.
101. However, recent research at the University of California, San Diego indicates
it now takes fully four generations for immigrants' wages to catch up. Vlae Kershner,
Calculating the Cost of Immigration, S.F. CHRON., June 23, 1993, at Al. In tile
meantime, new immigration may have taken its place.
102. Sergio Mufioz, The Divisiveness of Half-Truths, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1992,
at B7.
Another Mexican-American commentator, Richard Rodriguez, also has stressed that
Mexicans work, and work hard. Richard Rodriguez, Closed Doors; The Immigrant: To
Work or Die in California, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1993, at Ml. Rodriguez states:
"Californians are afraid of the future and cannot imagine themselves in the great world."
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Actually, there is some substantial doubt as to the division between
the displacement and expansion effects of immigrant labor. There is
increasing concern that, with low skills, immigrants are displacing
American workers. University of Texas Professor Frank Bean con-
cluded in an August 1993 study that unemployment among African-
Americans tends to rise in areas with large numbers of immigrants
and a soft labor market. 103 Other economists agree as well. Accord-
ing to the New York Times:
The huge flow of low-skilled immigrants into a depressed economy has be-
gun to change the thinking among some economists. Among those who has
[sic] changed his mind is George J. Borjas of the University of California,
San Diego. His 1990 book, "Friends or Strangers: The Impact of Immi-
grants on the U.S. Economy" (Basic Books), concluded that immigrants
had not undermined Americans' income or job opportunities. Now, he says
there is indeed an effect.
"If we have a huge influx of unskilled immigrants, it's almost unavoida-
ble that the unskilled labor market will be affected," he said in a recent
interview.
04
Huddle estimates that immigrants displaced 914,000 California em-
ployees in 1992, costing the state $4.2 billion in unemployment in-
surance and other government benefits; he calculates the largest
effect in general depression of wage levels. Illegal immigration in
particular, contributes to a labor surplus that depresses farm wages
and makes working conditions worse, according to one recent bipar-
tisan report. 105
There is also anecdotal evidence of job displacement. For example,
according to the executive vice president of Hospital and Service
Employees Union Local 399 in Los Angeles, in the 1980s Los Ange-
les office building janitors, largely black, were displaced by Mexican
and then Central American immigrants. The number of union jani-
tors dropped from 13,000 to 8,000, average pay dropped from $7.32
an hour plus full benefits to $6.35 an hour, with many non-union
janitors being illegal immigrants making between $4.25 and $5 an
Id.
Noting the "inevitable free flow of cash and labor around the modern world," Rodri-
guez writes, "[d]espite ourselves and because of the immigrants, California is becoming a
world society - an extraordinary meeting place of Asia and Latin America with white
and black America .... California does not have an immigrant problem. California has
a native-born problem." Id. at M6. Left unsaid, apparently, was whether the resident
population has decided it wants to become a "world society," or be taxed to pay for it.
103. Herbert A. Sample, Do Illegal Migrants Take Minority Jobs?, SACRAMENTO
BEE, Aug. 29, 1993, at A3.
104. Reinhold, supra note 12, at Al, A12.
105. Immigration; A Giant Sucking Sound, supra note 66, at 28.
1005
hour with few benefits. 106
Although it is often asserted that immigrants take low-paying or
unpleasant jobs that residents will not, most commentators ignore
the possibility that it is only an overly generous welfare system that
enables residents to decline such work. For example, James Flani-
gan, business writer for the Los Angeles Times, says that low-skilled,
inner city residents could take such jobs, but don't because of "social
neglect."'10 7 The obvious suggestion is that immigration reform be
tied to welfare reform.
In any event, the point is taken that immigrants may well contrib-
ute to the economy. The difficulty arises from the fact that most of
the benefits are private, while many of the costs are public. In addi-
tion, the availability of this labor pool makes it possible to maintain
such anti-competitive and socially harmful anachronisms as mini-
mum wage laws which keep low-skill Americans unemployed and
welfare programs that do not demand that recipients work.
Changing age demographics of California and the United States
do indicate potentially serious labor shortages in the future. The pop-
ulation overall is aging rapidly as people live longer. Moreover, de-
spite immigration from different cultures, overall birth rates remain
relatively low outside of California; small family size seems to be a
common element to post-industrial Western societies, and the whole-
sale entry of women into the workforce indicates that this will con-
tinue. Although demographers have been surprised at the numbers
of women who now begin families in their mid-to-late thirties (the
so-called baby boomlet), lowered birthrates nationally, if not in Cali-
fornia, seem permanent.
This change is elaborated in the following extract from An
America That Works, a recent publication of the Committee for Ec-
onomic Development (CED) in New York:
Over the next decade, the rates of growth in the prime working-age popula-
tion and the retirement population will be roughly equal. This parity is a
significant change from the prior twelve years, when the average annual
growth of 25- to 54-year-old group was fifty percent larger than for the 55
and over group. In the future, we will have relatively fewer working-age
people than in the past to support the retired population.10 8
Moreover, this parity in growth between the two age groups is a
prelude to a period of much more rapid growth for the 55 and older
group than for those 25 to 54 years old. The trend is even sharper
than for those 75 and over.
An Urban Institute report by demographer Jeffrey Passel, released
106. Lee, supra note 35, at Al.
107. James Flanigan, Blaming Immigrants Won't Solve Economic Woes, LA.
TIMEs, Aug. 15, 1993, at Dl.
108. RESEARCH AND POLICY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOP-
MENT. AN AMERICA THAT WORKS 3 (1990).
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August 9, 1993, stated that immigrants will constitute more than
fourteen percent of the U.S. workforce by the year 2010, twice the
proportion of the 1980 workforce. New workers, from an estimated
950,000 legal immigrants annually, will replace the older "Baby
Boomers" who will begin retiring in large numbers in the next fifteen
years.
In short, the national labor pool in the future will be a smaller
percentage of the population. It will also have higher demands put
on it, as society struggles to meet the medical and pension needs of a
larger retired population. At the same time, the skills level required
of tomorrow's workforce will be (and to some extent already is) sig-
nificantly higher and different than today. In a free-trading world,
neither the United States nor California can compete on the basis of
unskilled labor. Our competitive advantage, if we wish to maintain
reasonable standards of living, must come in adding value. That re-
quires an educated workforce and high productivity.
There have been a number of suggestions of steps we, as a society,
can take towards these ends. First, we can remove uneconomic and
anti-competitive retirement restrictions; people ought to work as long
as they want to and are able to contribute. Second, we can revise our
education system to stress real, competitive skills, perhaps producing
more engineers and fewer lawyers. In the modern world, usable edu-
cation is a competitive advantage. Third, we can reform our tax sys-
tem and labor laws to encourage savings, investment, and
productivity.
Immigration policy can be a useful adjunct to all these efforts. As
noted in the summary of a RAND study developed for the CED:
Immigration has historically played an important role in supplying U.S. la-
bor needs. However, current immigration and immigrant policies emphasize
noneconomic selection criteria, such as family reunification, for determining
the annual volume and characteristics of legal immigrants ...
[D]emographics and changes in the labor market require policymakers to
review that emphasis and consider more explicitly how immigration relates
to U.S. labor market needs.1° 9
The RAND study notes that as much as forty percent of all new
jobs created in the economy between 1988 and 2000 are likely to be
in professional, technical, and managerial fields, with another third
in skilled service jobs. Yet much of current immigration is low-
skilled and low-waged, and that threatens to create a two-tier soci-
ety. The study also points out that most immigrants wind up in the
109. GEORGE VERNEZ & KEVIN MCCARTHY, MEETING THE EcONoMy's LABOR
NEEDS THROUGH IMMIGRATION: RATIONALE AND CHALLENGES (1990).
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labor pool, anyway, no matter why they came here, and therefore
workforce impacts should be considered in any event.
Under current law, however, according to the RAND study,
"family reunion is the dominant criterion for permanent legal en-
try." This has important ramifications not only for workforce needs,
but implications for disproportionate regional and local impacts, in-
cluding displacement of existing workers and depression of wage
levels, in addition to the significant fiscal burdens already discussed.
Workforce or occupation-related immigrants tend to go where the
jobs are. Family reunification or relative immigrants, by definition,
go where there are already existing concentrations of immigrants.
The Center for Immigration Studies in Washington, D.C., for exam-
ple, estimates that less than five percent of legal immigrants qualify
for entry to the United States because of special work skills or
training. 110
Legal immigration during federal fiscal year 1992, for example,
included, in addition to 170,720 spouses and minor children of U.S.
citizens: 64,764 parents of U.S. citizens; 33,800 adult sons and
daughters of U.S. citizens; 169,248 spouses and children of perma-
nent resident aliens; and 58,749 brothers and sisters of U.S. citizens.
Another 117,037 refugees, 33,911 winners of the diversity "lottery,"
and 59 million-dollar investors were admitted. Another 46,859 came
in under miscellaneous categories, and 110,032 non-priority workers
and their families were admitted. Of the total of 810,635 legal en-
tries, only 5,456 consisted of "priority workers" and their families.
Indeed, according to Borjas, "the skill composition of the immi-
grant flow . . . has deteriorated significantly in the past two or three
decades."' The immigration of large numbers of poorly schooled
young people also makes more difficult the process of educating and
training the immigrant population that will be necessary if the U.S.
is to benefit from their arrival." 2 Borjas points out that twelve to
thirteen percent of all U.S. high school dropouts in 1980 were illegal
immigrants; in 1990, twenty-five percent. Half of all immigrants cur-
rently residing in California arrived here during the 1980s, and most
are poorly educated, with only fifty-four percent completing high
school.
The skills levels of most immigrants are completely unrelated to
U.S. economic needs. Briggs, for example, points out that in 1991
U.S. employment dropped and unemployment rose by over a million;
during the same year, immigration totalled more than 1.8 million. 13
I 10. IMMIGRATION RELATED STATISTICS, supra note 16.
111. George J. Borjas, FRIENDS OR STRANGERS: THE IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS ON
THE U.S. ECONOMY 8 (1990).
112. BOUVIER, DEMOGRAPHY OF AMERICA'S FUTURE, supra note 14, at 9.
113. VERNON BRIGGS. CENTER FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES. IMMIGRATION TIlE
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Of these immigrants, 1,827,167 were granted permanent resident
alien status in 1991, over half (932,000) cited their occupation at
time of entry as being farm workers. California received fully forty
percent of the total, or 735,732.
As reported in the popular press,
Ninety percent of current immigrants arrive from Third World countries
with income and social-service levels one-tenth or even one-twentieth those
of the United States. Their education levels relative to those of native-born
Americans are steadily declining. So are their earnings. George Borjas of
the University of California, San Diego, says that in 1970 the average im-
migrant actually earned 3 percent more than a native-born American but
by 1990 was earning 16 percent less.""
This deterioration in skill levels is amplified by changes in the
needs of the U.S. economy. MIT urban planner Abel Valenzuela
notes, "Turn-of-the-century European immigrants, many of them il-
literate or unskilled, were funneled into the type of manufacturing
jobs that no longer exist in the United States."'15
As pointed out by another commentator,
The economy of the past 200 years was mostly labor-intensive. With ad-
vances in technology, our economy now requires highly skilled workers to
prosper. Yet nearly two-thirds of the legal immigrants entering this country
every year are low-skilled. Half of them enter occupations that are disap-
pearing, where they compete mostly with poor minority workers.116
It is a competitive advantage to the United States that people all
over the world want to come here. The same is true of California.
We may use this competitive advantage to our benefit. Instead of
focusing on family reunification, which usually implies the addition
of dependents and gives relatively little consideration of benefit to
the larger U.S. society, immigration policy could be based more on
workforce needs, skills, and on the lifetime contribution that an indi-
vidual is likely to make to this country. In effect, we should be using
the attractiveness of the United States to engineer a "brain drain" to
our benefit. In addition, California by itself should investigate at-
tracting to the state those immigrants into the U.S. who meet
workforce needs."1
7
NEGLECTED ORPHAN OF EcoNoMIc POLICY (1993). Briggs suggests a shift of immigra-
tion responsibilities from the U.S. Department of Justice back to the Department of La-
bor, where it was until World War II.
114. Rich Thomas & Andrew Murr, The Economic Cost of Immigration, NEWs-
WEEK, Aug. 9, 1993, at 19.
115. Susan Ferriss, Immigrants: Teach Them Well, California Told, TIMEs-PICA-
YUNE, Sept. 28, 1993, at A3.
116. Yeh Ling-Ling, supra note 99, at B7.
117. One commentator, economics Nobel laureate Gary Becker, has suggested:
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X. POLICY OPTIONS
Virtually any policy option designed to moderate population
growth is fraught with social tension and political controversy. Fam-
ily planning and immigration reform are primary examples. How-
ever, the most desirable policy option would be for the federal
government to live up to its responsibilities and compensate Califor-
nia for the huge unfunded mandate inherent in federal immigration
policies.
A. Family Planning
The largest immediate component of California's growth is natu-
ral increase (net births over deaths). Most of this growth again can
be indirectly attributed to foreign immigration, whose cultural norms
include larger families than are usual in this country. This phenome-
non will lessen over time as succeeding generations become more as-
similated to American culture, but in the meantime new waves of
immigration may repeat the same effect.
The suggestions of effective controls on natural increase appear
impracticable under current social, political, and legal restrictions.
Large families impose a measurable, real cost on state services and
other citizens generally. However, in a democratic and fundamen-
tally Western society, the state does not forcibly interfere with pri-
vate family decisions. Moreover, these suggestions raise real fears,
whether well-founded or not, that they are directed against ethnic or
racial minorities. As such, they are intensely divisive.
As with most questions, this is not an all-or-nothing issue. The
governor has been consistently supportive of birth control, family
planning clinics, and education, but the personal choice of family
size still ultimately remains with individuals and families. Such sup-
port may be expanded and strengthened without restricting this per-
sonal choice.
Other indirect incentives and disincentives may be available to
moderate natural population increase, but their practical success and
political acceptability may be problematic. In addition to traditional
family planning efforts, suggestions have been made for other indi-
rect incentives and disincentives to moderate natural population in-
creases. These suggestions include limitations on dependent tax
[T]he most rational approach would be to sell the right to immigrate, but a less
radical method of improving present policy and combating illegal immigration
would be to allow a larger number of skilled and young people to enter legally.
To prevent immigrants from taking advantage of government handouts, how-
ever, they should not be eligible for welfare, food stamps, government-financed
health care, or certain other benefits until they become naturalized citizens.
Gary S. Becker, Illegal Immigration: How to Turn the Tide, Bus. WEEK, Feb. 22, 1993,
at 23.
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deductions and caps on welfare benefits (such a step was taken in
New Jersey, effective October 1, 1992), or conversely, provision for
additional benefits to recipients who accept birth control measures,
and withholding or reduction of benefits to those who do not have
high school diplomas or G.E.D.s, unless they are currently working
to receive one or the other, or conversely, providing additional bene-
fits to teen mothers who stay in high school.
The main brunt of such measures may fall on those at the lower
end of the economic spectrum, those receiving public benefits, and
recent immigrants whose cultural norms include large families. The
practical effect would thus be a disproportionate impact on ethnic
and racial minorities, hence the intense political and social divisive-
ness of this issue.
B. Immigration Reform
The nation is currently admitting very large numbers of poor, un-
skilled immigrants, with no policy rationale. (Indeed, all coherent
policy points in the opposite direction.) The economic needs that
supported such immigration flows in the 19th and early 20th cenitu-
ries no longer exist. We should no longer want to compete on the
basis of cheap, unskilled labor, unless we wish to emulate the living
standards of Calcutta and Shanghai. Instead, we should be adding
value and competing upmarket by admitting more immigrants with
skills, capital, and education. Traditionally, the U.S. has had a gen-
erous attitude toward family reunification and open immigration.
However, circumstances and the world have changed. The numbers
of persons able and willing to immigrate, in an increasingly over-
crowded and economically troubled world with access to easy inter-
national travel, could easily overwhelm the U.S. and California
specifically.
In particular, while the focus of U.S. immigration policy on family
reunification is both historic and understandable in human terms,
the recent expansion of family reunification as an immigration cate-
gory comprising fully three-quarters (or 520,000 of 700,000 places
annually) is questionable. The argument has been made that the
United States, and in particular California, because of its dispropor-
tionately high share of immigration, cannot continue indefinitely to
take in half-a-million people a year without regard to skills or contri-
bution. As the Chairman of the 1981 Select Commission on Immi-
gration and Refugee Policy, Father Hesburgh, noted, "[W]e believe
there are many benefits which immigrants bring to U.S. society . ..
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we [also] believe there are limits on the ability of this country to
absorb large numbers of immigrants effectively." It is also something
of a misnomer, proponents of reform assert, to call this category
"family reunification." In fact, adding up the various preference cat-
egories, it includes parents, siblings, and ultimately others, and puts
the United States into a choice whereby admission of one individual
may ultimately mean admission of many more.
Proposals have been made, accordingly, to reform U.S. immigra-
tion law in the direction of workforce needs. The RAND study dis-
cusses various Congressional proposals, as well as the Canadian
system, which awards additional "points" to family reunion immi-
grants, but still looks to applicants' other qualifications, such as
training, education, and language capability. The study suggests
greater emphasis on labor market considerations to help meet chang-
ing demands for labor, while minimizing the current negative distri-
butional effects which penalize California and speed up the economic
and social integration of immigrants into the United States. 118
A complementary step would be to re-examine U.S. refugee pol-
icy, including focusing U.S. efforts on international assistance, not
domestic resettlement; offsetting any refugee admissions against im-
migration caps; basing refugee decisions on clear policies, consist-
ently applied, rather than case-by-case political considerations; and
conditioning U.S. refugee admissions, and international financial as-
sistance, on other nations doing their fair share in each.
In addition, the United States should re-examine its refugee pol-
icy. As the world grows smaller while its population continues to
rise, there is a limit to what this country can or should absorb. Every
natural or social upheaval should not be treated as the responsibility
of the United States. We cannot take in everybody.
The following changes could be made:
1. U.S. efforts should be focused on international assistance, not domestic
resettlement, on helping refugees where they are, not moving them to the
United States. This is far more cost-effective, avoids de facto immigration
under the guise of refugee policy, and brings home the essential fact that
foreign populations, and not the U.S., are ultimately responsible for what
happens in their home countries.
2. Any refugee admissions should be offset against immigration caps. This
will ensure that refugee policy does not vitiate immigration policy, and that
the U.S. maintains policy control over the total numbers of persons admit-
ted to this country.
3. Refugee decisions should be made on the basis of clear policies, consist-
ently applied, rather than case-by-case political considerations.
4. U.S. refugee admissions, and international financial assistance, should be
conditioned on other nations doing their fair share in each area.
118. Bouvier also points to the Canadian example. BouviER, DEMOGRAPHY OF
AMERICA'S FUTURE, supra note 14, at 11 ("Our immigration policy should concentrate
on what is good for the United States rather than on what is good for the immigrants.").
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In summary, immigration and refugee policy can be changed to
give greater focus to U.S. workforce needs, without regard to race,
ethnicity, or origin. Once admitted, related family admissions can be
limited to the immediate nuclear family - spouses, children, and
possibly parents. The total overall numbers admitted into the United
States should be lowered, precisely the reverse of the policy steps
taken by the Congress in the 1990 changes to immigration law. The
1980 Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy,
chaired by then-president of Notre Dame University, the Rev. Theo-
dore Hesburgh, recommended that legal immigration be reduced to
500,000. With any significant level of domestic unemployment, there
is simply no reason to admit large numbers of unskilled immigrants.
To the degree that such immigrants take jobs that Americans will
not, U.S. welfare laws ought to be reformed so that Americans will.
To the extent that such immigrants provide an economic benefit by
performing work at lower wages, that is a short-term, private benefit
outweighed by the public and long-term social costs.
C. State Costs
Federal law should specifically compensate California for the dis-
proportionate impact on our state from foreign immigration. This in-
cludes not only full SLIAG funding, but coverage for other impacts
such as traffic, housing, and congestion generally. The federal gov-
ernment does not have a moral right to balance its immigration poli-
cies on the backs of California taxpayers. California should strive to
use its large voting strength in the U.S. House of Representatives,
together with that of other immigration-impacted states, to press for
these necessary changes.
Proposals have also been made to ensure that state benefits them-
selves are extended only to bona fide legal residents. Again, certain
measures have already been undertaken, such as barring illegal im-
migrants from resident tuition rates in public higher education.
There are also other steps California may take by itself to discourage
illegal immigration:
1. The State Employment Development Department (EDD) and other state
agencies could be specifically directed to ascertain immigration status and
provide information and services only to legal residents.
2. All state agencies, law enforcement authorities and service providers
could be directed affirmatively to provide full cooperation with the INS.
3. State action, including the withholding of funds, could be taken against
cities and counties who refuse such cooperation. All units of government,
including such local jurisdictions, would serve only legal residents, with ex-
ceptions for emergency services, and affirmatively cooperate with the INS
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and law enforcement authorities.
4. Illegal immigrants could be denied admission to higher education facili-
ties, including the University of California, the California State University,
the CSU system, and community colleges. Although federal law requires
that the state fund primary and secondary education for children of illegal
immigrants, if federal law permits, school authorities could be obliged to
check for legal resident status of enrolled students, and advise state authori-
ties of those who cannot provide it.
5. Similarly, steps could be taken to ensure that other state benefits are
extended only to bona fide legal residents.
6. The State Bar could institute a regular and comprehensive auditing pro-
gram of immigration attorneys in order to combat fraud.
7. Illegal immigrants arrested, tried, or convicted of crimes should be de-
ported immediately rather than housed in prison at taxpayer expense. This
will require cooperation with the INS. In cases where the individual is
deemed likely to return to the U.S., deportation would be effected towards
the end of incarceration.
Along these lines, the Claremont Institute's Lance Izumi and for-
mer INS Commissioner Alan Nelson have proposed requiring all
state agencies to use the INS computer data system that identifies
who is here legally and who is not, requiring state and local employ-
ment agencies to screen legal immigrants for job placement, restrict-
ing entry to state universities to legal residents only, and requiring
information-sharing between state and local agencies and the
INS. 19 The "S.O.S." initiative, discussed above, also has been being
circulated within the state to deny illegal immigrants all state ser-
vices except emergency medical care. The measure may be unconsti-
tutional under current federal case law, at least regarding the
provisions of public education, but it may be intended to force a re-
view of court decisions.
It is evident that many, if not most, proposals such as these are
likely to be socially divisive and intensely controversial. On the other
hand, we are faced with hard policy choices, and avoiding them sim-
ply ensures that choices are made by default. Whatever policy op-
tions are chosen should be pursued only after full public debate with
adequate opportunity for participation by all parties.
Legal immigrants, once here, should be helped to be successful.
Federal policy should not admit large numbers of immigrants who
need assistance and services, and then dump them on state taxpay-
ers. This is particularly unfair to California, which receives propor-
tionally three or four times its share of total immigration. It is most
unfair of all, however, to the legal immigrants themselves, who are
prevented by lack of government funding from making the fullest
contribution of which they are capable.
119. What State Can Do About Illegal Immigration, SACRAMENTO UNION, Aug.
15, 1993.
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XI. CONCLUSION
As a practical matter, California's ability to take steps to moder-
ate its population growth is highly problematic. Family planning ef-
forts are voluntary and controversial, immigration and refugee policy
is beyond the state's reach and equally controversial, and interstate
movement is not only constitutionally protected but is net negative in
any event.
A more realistic, less controversial and more immediate approach
would be to seek federal action on two levels: (1) reform immigra-
tion law to focus on workforce needs; and (2) compensate California
for the hugely disproportionate financial burden it bears for the na-
tion's immigration and refugee policies.
In the meantime, as long as California is a good place to live,
people will want to come here. If California's public policy, laws,
and implementation strategies are unable to cope with further popu-
lation increases, and if the quality of life, the economy, and the envi-
ronment are sufficiently degraded, growth will stop and population
will decline as residents seek more hospitable locations. It is only
through such a failure of public policy that the projections of popula-
tion increase reverse. However, that increase can be moderated, con-
trolled, and compensated. Unmanaged growth can overwhelm the
state. Managed growth can continue to focus on the quality of life
for all Californians.
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